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EDITORIAL

THE correspondence which has been carried on in these pages under the title of "Ecclesiastical Transcendentalism?" is now formally closed. There is this objection to a protracted correspondence in a monthly journal that after a few months its readers can hardly be expected to keep in mind the starting-point and the previous course of the discussion. But while this particular correspondence is closed we do not anticipate that the issues which it has raised will cease to be debated. They will continue to be urgent, and are likely to become more so.

We believe that the differences which have been exposed in this correspondence are due in part to the kind of misunderstanding which is inevitable where there is no common universe of theological discourse. But as well as misunderstanding there is undoubtedly disagreement. The causes of this are more complex than may appear at first sight. Even those who agree about abstract principles may disagree as to how they apply to a concrete situation. A statement recently issued by the International Christian Press and Information Service at Geneva contained these words:

"There are those who feel strongly that the Church should pronounce a prophetic judgment concerning the responsibility for the disastrous events of recent months, and there are those who believe no less strongly that the Church must concentrate exclusively on the task of reconciliation. And there are among Christian leaders fundamental differences in their interpretation and evaluation of the main forces which are in conflict with each other to-day."[1]

The statement adds that in the last resort this difference in attitude "is based on a different conception of the task of the Church in the world and a different interpretation of the political realities." It was to be expected that at least some of these differences would be reflected in the correspondence which we have published.

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[1] See the *Guardian*, February 2, 1940.

We are glad to be able to publish this month a full translation of Dr Karl Barth's important letter. Dr Barth hopes to hear what impression the contents of his letter make on English theologians, and we shall forward to him any comments upon it that are sent to us. Some readers may be surprised at his strong assertion of the concern of the Church with social justice, for it is widely supposed that the revival of Protestant theology on the continent is in line with the Lutheran tradition in this matter.

Dr Barth asks why the ecumenical movement has been silent. The statement from which we have already quoted is designed to answer this question. The ecumenical movement " must simply accept the fact that the Churches have not received a common word from God concerning the political choices which Christians have to make to-day. . . . As long as that common word is not given to it, it is better that it should be silent concerning the political disasters of our time, rather than speak in generalities and formulas of compromise which are irrelevant to the real situation."

We shall never, however, receive " a common word from God " unless we look for it and prepare ourselves to receive it. We must not just be resigned to our present disability, as though nothing can be done about it. It arises, in part at least, from sin, from an unwillingness to know the truth. One of the best ways of arriving at a deeper understanding is to study expressions of conviction which come out of a background and tradition different from our own.

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In this connexion the non-Roman Churches have more to learn from the Church of Rome than they may be ready to admit. The Roman Church is equipped with a doctrine of natural law or justice which gives to the papal encyclicals, for instance, a weight and coherence which are conspicuously lacking in the pronouncements of other Christian bodies. This doctrine of natural law no doubt still bears the marks of the feudal or hierarchical order of society in which it was formulated, and therefore, if it is to be applicable to the conditions of a collective and industrialized society, it may require a more thorough reinterpretation than the Roman authorities have yet succeeded in providing. Even so, this doctrine has enabled them to make a profounder

criticism of the maladies of modern society than has come from any other source.

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The Master of Balliol's new book, *The Two Moralities: Our Duty to God and to Society* (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 3s.), deals with similar problems in a popular, non-technical way, and will help the general reader to see why there can be no simple solution of a perfectionist kind. Dr Lindsay draws a distinction between the morality of "my station and its duties" and the morality of "grace" or "the challenge to perfection." The former he compares to playing the game and keeping the rules. There could be no order in society, nor indeed could those who compose it have any freedom assured to them without laws, customs and conventions, and, however strongly these are supported by willing consent, yet it is also necessary that, where refusal to obey them threatens the social order, they shall be enforced. "The main object of rules is to maintain rights: that is, to give us an assurance that within certain lines of action we and other people shall be protected from arbitrary interference." They are thus of no use unless they are generally kept, and they cannot be "judgments of how we think people ought ideally to behave." "The morality of my station and its duties is . . . necessarily imperfect, necessarily relative and necessarily changeable." But it is all the time necessary: "We cannot escape from the necessities of social life or from our responsibility for the organization of society."

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In contrast with the morality of my station and its duties there is the morality of challenge or grace. The demands of this are not our demands nor the demands of society; its demands and its challenge are the challenge of God. "Be ye therefore perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect." Dr Lindsay finds nine respects in which this morality seems to be contrasted with the other. The contrast corresponds to that which some writers draw between the law of justice and the law of love, though the use of the word "law" in the latter phrase is misleading, since the demand that God makes upon us cannot be defined in general terms nor codified in a set of rules. Moreover, we can never live up to it, whereas many people do live up to

the demands of " my station and its duties," and in fact surpass them. And the morality of grace is indeed a perpetual spur to dissatisfaction with existing standards. This dual element in our moral obligations we are reluctant to recognize. There are two ways of evading it. One is to settle down with an easy conscience within the limits of the accepted morality; the other is to refuse responsibility for that, and to seek a life of perfection apart from it. Dr Lindsay recognizes that " there is value in the existence within society of communities or fellowships avowedly trying to work out and express a higher standard of conduct than society as a whole expresses. . . . But it is mere hypocrisy for such communities or fellowships to pride themselves on their superior standards and not to realize that their freedom and their distinctive life are made possible by the protection which society gives them." There are times, too, when a prophetic minority can contribute to the progress of society as a whole by refusing co-operation at a particular point: " If the prophet is convinced that his business is to make his contemporaries realize the evil to which they are blind, he is almost bound to come in conflict with the morality of my station and its duties. It is unreasonable . . . to ask him to act ' reasonably.' "

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Dr Lindsay says that it is the function of the Church to produce prophets, but he does not appear to contemplate that a situation may arise when the Church as a community temporarily and *ad hoc* ought to bear the prophetic witness of a minority or remnant. In a Christian society (in Mr Eliot's sense of the term) such a situation would not arise, but in a pagan, and even in a neutral society, is it not a possibility that has to be reckoned with? There are differences between Christians in this country which spring from different judgments as to the character and prospects of our own society; Christians who recognize that they have necessary obligations to the social order may nevertheless believe that at certain points those obligations are rightly met by defiance instead of conformity.

" From time to time the tension (between the Kingdom of God and the standards of this world) becomes peculiarly acute at one point or another, as one or another manifestation of the evil in the world becomes flagrant, or as the Christian conscience becomes especially sensitive upon a

particular issue. The Christian may then be driven to make a stand, even to the extent of withdrawing from the social order in that particular respect at that particular time." [1]

This is quite a different thing from the advocacy of social irresponsibility, although it may easily be perverted into a doctrine which has implications of that kind.

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We cordially welcome the series of shilling books, entitled " Signposts," which are being published by the Dacre Press at monthly intervals during this year. They are to be the work of a group of young theologians, and are likely to throw light on the reputed cleavage between the generations which is still under discussion in THEOLOGY. The first of the series—*The Fate of Modern Culture*, by J. V. Langmead Casserley—has set a high standard for those that are to follow.

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As we go to press we have received the news of Professor Creed's sudden death. The loss to the Faculty of Divinity at Cambridge and to English theology generally is as grave as it was unforeseen. Those who knew him only by repute were inclined to suppose that he was a narrowly academic theologian. He was academic in the strongest sense. The Cambridge tradition of exact scholarship and restrained assertion was embodied in him—the tradition that ran from Hort through Swete and Stanton. His commentary on St Luke's Gospel may have encouraged the idea that he was more concerned about technical questions of higher and lower criticism than about the wider issues in New Testament theology. The more recently published Hulsean Lectures, *The Divinity of Jesus Christ*, will already have gone far to show how false that idea was. His friends confidently looked to him for guidance of the kind that is now most needed; it seems a disaster that he will no longer be here to give it. Professor Creed was among the first of those to whom the present Editor of THEOLOGY turned for advice and help and from whom he received that friendly and critical encouragement that is most worth having. His sympathetic and forward-moving mind was always at the service of younger men.

[1] C. H. Dodd on " The Theology of Christian Pacifism," in *The Bases of Christian Pacifism* (published by the Council of Christian Pacifist Groups).

Christianity and Culture

" If the heavenly life is not grown up in you, it signifies nothing what you have chosen in the stead of it, or why you have chosen it."—WILLIAM LAW.

AT an early age I came to believe that the life of culture (that is, of intellectual and æsthetic activity) was very good for its own sake, or even that it was the good for man. After my conversion, which occurred in my later twenties, I continued to hold this belief without consciously asking how it could be reconciled with my new belief that the end of human life was salvation in Christ and the glorifying of God. I was awakened from this confused state of mind by finding that the friends of culture seemed to me to be exaggerating. In my reaction against what seemed exaggerated I was driven to the other extreme, and began, in my own mind, to belittle the claims of culture. As soon as I did this I was faced with the question, " If it is a thing of so little value, how are you justified in spending so much of your life on it ?"

The present inordinate esteem of culture by the cultured began, I think, with Matthew Arnold—at least if I am right in supposing that he first popularized the use of the English word *spiritual* in the sense of German *geistlich*. This was nothing less than the identification of levels of life hitherto usually distinguished. After Arnold came the vogue of Croce, in whose philosophy the æsthetic and logical activities were made autonomous forms of " the spirit " co-ordinate with the ethical. There followed the poetics of Dr I. A. Richards. This great atheist critic found in a good poetical taste the means of attaining psychological adjustments which improved a man's power of effective and satisfactory living all round, while bad taste resulted in a corresponding loss. Since his theory of value was a purely psychological one, this amounted to giving poetry a kind of soteriological function; it held the keys of the only heaven that Dr Richards believed in. His work (which I respect profoundly) was continued, though not always in directions that he accepted, by the editors of *Scrutiny*,[1] who believe in " a necessary relationship between the quality of the individual's response to art and his general fitness for humane living." Finally, as might have been expected, a somewhat similar view was

[1] I take *Scrutiny* throughout as it is represented in Brother Every's article. An independent criticism of that periodical is no part of my purpose.

expressed by a Christian writer: in fact by Brother Every in THEOLOGY for March, 1939. In an article entitled "The Necessity of *Scrutiny*" Brother Every inquired what Mr Eliot's admirers were to think of a Church where those who seemed to be theologically equipped preferred Housman, Mr Charles Morgan, and Miss Sayers, to Lawrence, Joyce and Mr E. M. Forster; he spoke (I think with sympathy) of the "sensitive questioning individual" who is puzzled at finding the same judgments made by Christians as by "other conventional people"; and he talked of "testing" theological students as regards their power to evaluate a new piece of writing on a secular subject.

As soon as I read this there was the devil to pay. I was not sure that I understood—I am still not sure that I understand—Brother Every's position. But I felt that some readers might easily get the notion that "sensitivity" or good taste were among the *notes* of the true Church, or that coarse, unimaginative people were less likely to be saved than refined and poetic people. In the heat of the moment I rushed to the opposite extreme. I felt, with some spiritual pride, that I had been saved in the nick of time from being "sensitive." The "sentimentality and cheapness" of much Christian hymnody had been a strong point in my own resistance to conversion. Now I felt almost thankful for the bad hymns.[1] It was good that we should have to lay down our precious refinement at the very doorstep of the church; good that we should be cured at the outset of our now inveterate confusion between *psyche* and *pneuma*, nature and supernature.

A man is never so proud as when striking an attitude of humility. Brother Every will not suspect me of being still in the condition I describe, nor of still attributing to him the preposterous beliefs I have just suggested. But there remains, none the less, a real problem which his article forced upon me in its most acute form. No one, presumably, is really maintaining that a fine taste in the arts is a condition of salvation. Yet the glory of God, and, as our only means to

[1] We should be cautious of assuming that we know what their most banal expressions actually stand for in the minds of uneducated, holy persons. Of a saint's conversation Patmore says: "He will most likely dwell with reiteration on commonplaces with which you were perfectly acquainted before you were twelve years old; but you must . . . remember that the knowledge which is to you a superficies is to him a solid" (*Rod, Root and Flower, Magna Moralia* xiv).

glorifying Him, the salvation of human souls, is the real business of life. What, then, is the value of culture? It is, of course, no new question; but as a living question it was new to me.

I naturally turned first to the New Testament. Here I found, in the first place, a demand that whatever is most highly valued on the natural level is to be held, as it were, merely on sufferance, and to be abandoned without mercy the moment it conflicts with the service of God. The organs of sense (Matt. v, 29) and of virility (Matt. xix, 12) may have to be sacrificed. And I took it that the least these words could mean was that a life, by natural standards, crippled and thwarted was not only no bar to salvation, but might easily be one of its conditions. The text about hating father and mother (Luke xiv, 26) and our Lord's apparent belittling even of His own natural relation to the Blessed Virgin (Matt. xii, 48) were even more discouraging. I took it for granted that anyone in his senses would hold it better to be a good son than a good critic, and that whatever was said of natural affection was implied *a fortiori* of culture. The worst of all was Philippians iii, 8, where something obviously more relevant to spiritual life than culture can be—" blameless " conformity to the Jewish Law—was described as " muck."

In the second place I found a number of emphatic warnings against every kind of superiority. We were told to become as children (Matt. xviii, 3), not to be called Rabbi (Matt. xxiii, 8), to dread reputation (Luke vi, 26). We were reminded that few of the σοφοὶ κατὰ σάρκα—which, I suppose, means precisely the intelligentsia—are called (1 Cor. i, 26); that a man must become a fool by secular standards before he can attain real wisdom (1 Cor. iii, 18).

Against all this I found some passages that could be interpreted in a sense more favourable to culture. I argued that secular learning might be embodied in the Magi; that the Talents in the parable might conceivably include " talents " in the modern sense of the word; that the miracle at Cana in Galilee by sanctifying an innocent, sensuous pleasure[1] could be taken to sanctify at least a recreational use of culture—mere " entertainment "; and that æsthetic enjoyment of nature was certainly hallowed by our Lord's praise of the lilies. At least some use of science was implied

[1] On a possible deeper significance in this miracle, see F. Mauriac, *Vie de Jésus*, cap. 5, *ad fin.*

in St Paul's demand that we should perceive the Invisible through the visible (Rom. i, 20). But I was more than doubtful whether his exhortation, "Be not children in mind" (1 Cor. xiv, 20), and his boast of "wisdom" among the initiate, referred to anything that we should recognize as secular culture.

On the whole, the New Testament seemed, if not hostile, yet unmistakably cold to culture. I think we can still believe culture to be innocent after we have read the New Testament; I cannot see that we are encouraged to think it important.

It might be important none the less, for Hooker has finally answered the contention that Scripture must contain everything important or even everything necessary. Remembering this, I continued my researches. If my selection of authorities seems arbitrary, that is due not to a bias but to my ignorance. I used such authors as I happened to know.

Of the great pagans Aristotle is on our side. Plato will tolerate no culture that does not directly or indirectly conduce either to the intellectual vision of the good or the military efficiency of the commonwealth. Mr Joyce and D. H. Lawrence would have fared ill in the Republic. The Buddha was, I believe, anti-cultural, but here especially I speak under correction.

St Augustine regarded the liberal education which he had undergone in his boyhood as a *dementia*, and wondered why it should be considered *honestior et uberior* than the really useful "primary" education which preceded it (*Conf.* I, xiii). He is extremely distrustful of his own delight in church music (*ibid.* X, xxxiii). Tragedy (which for Dr Richards is "a great exercise of the spirit")[1] is for St Augustine a kind of sore. The spectator suffers, yet loves his suffering, and this is a *miserabilis insania . . . quid autem mirum cum infelix pecus aberrans a grege tuo et inpatiens custodiæ tuæ turpi scabie fœdarer* (*ibid.* III, ii).

St Jerome, allegorizing the parable of the Prodigal Son, suggests that the husks with which he was fain to fill his belly may signify *cibus dæmonum . . . carmina poetarum, sæcularis sapientia, rhetoricorum pompa verborum* (Ep. xxi, 4).

Let none reply that the Fathers were speaking of polytheistic literature at a time when polytheism was still a danger. The scheme of values presupposed in most

[1] *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 69.

imaginative literature has not become very much more Christian since the time of St Jerome. In *Hamlet* we see everything questioned *except* the duty of revenge. In all Shakespeare's works the conception of good really operative —whatever the characters may say—seems to be purely worldly. In medieval romance, honour and sexual love are the true values; in nineteenth-century fiction, sexual love and material prosperity. In romantic poetry, either the enjoyment of nature (ranging from pantheistic mysticism at one end of the scale to mere innocent sensuousness at the other) or else the indulgence of a *Sehnsucht* awakened by the past, the distant, and the imagined, but not believed, supernatural. In modern literature, the life of liberated instinct. There are, of course, exceptions: but to study these exceptions would not be to study literature as such, and as a whole. "All literatures," as Newman has said,[1] "are one; they are the voices of the natural man . . . if Literature is to be made a study of human nature, you cannot have a Christian Literature. It is a contradiction in terms to attempt a sinless Literature of sinful man." And I could not doubt that the sub-Christian or anti-Christian values implicit in most literature did actually infect many readers. Only a few days ago I was watching, in some scholarship papers, the results of this infection in a belief that the crimes of such Shakespearian characters as Cleopatra and Macbeth were somehow compensated for by a quality described as their "greatness." This very morning I have read in a critic the remark that if the wicked lovers in Webster's *White Devil* had repented we should hardly have forgiven them. And many people certainly draw from Keats's phrase about negative capability or "love of good and evil" (if the reading which attributes to him such meaningless words is correct) a strange doctrine that experience *simpliciter* is good. I do not say that the sympathetic reading of literature must produce such results, but that it may and often does. If we are to answer the Fathers' attack on pagan literature we must not ground our answer on a belief that literature as a whole has become, in any important sense, more Christian since their days.

In Thomas Aquinas I could not find anything directly bearing on my problem; but I am a very poor Thomist and shall be grateful for correction on this point.

[1] *Scope and Nature of University Education.* Discourse 8.

Thomas à Kempis I take to be definitely on the anti-cultural side.

In the *Theologia Germanica* (cap. xx) I found that nature's refusal of the life of Christ " happeneth most of all where there are high natural gifts of reason, for that soareth upwards in its own light and by its own power, till at last it cometh to think itself the true Eternal Light." But in a later chapter (xlii) I found the evil of the false light identified with its tendency to love knowledge and discernment more than the object known and discerned. This seemed to point to the possibility of a knowledge which avoided that error.

The cumulative effect of all this was very discouraging to culture. On the other side—perhaps only through the accidental distribution of my ignorance—I found much less.

I found the famous saying, attributed to Gregory, that our use of secular culture was comparable to the action of the Israelites in going down to the Philistines to have their knives sharpened. This seems to me a most satisfactory argument as far as it goes, and very relevant to modern conditions. If we are to convert our heathen neighbours, we must understand their culture. We must " beat them at their own game." But, of course, while this would justify Christian culture (at least for some Christians whose vocation lay in that direction) at the moment, it would come very far short of the claims made for culture in our modern tradition. On the Gregorian view culture is a weapon; and a weapon is essentially a thing we lay aside as soon as we safely can.

In Milton I found a disquieting ally. His *Areopagitica* troubled me just as Brother Every's article had troubled me. He seemed to make too little of the difficulties; and his glorious defence of freedom to explore all good and evil seemed, after all, to be based on an aristocratic preoccupation with great souls and a contemptuous indifference to the mass of mankind which, I suppose, no Christian can tolerate.

Finally I came to that book of Newman's from which I have already quoted, the lectures on *University Education*. Here at last I found an author who seemed to be aware of both sides of the question; for no one ever insisted so eloquently as Newman on the beauty of culture for its own sake, and no one ever so sternly resisted the temptation to confuse it with things spiritual. The cultivation of the

intellect, according to him, is " for this world ":[1] between it and " genuine religion " there is a " radical difference ";[2] it makes " not the Christian . . . but the gentleman," and looks like virtue " only at a distance ";[3] he " will not for an instant allow " that it makes men better.[4] The " pastors of the Church " may indeed welcome culture because it provides innocent distraction at those moments of spiritual relaxation which would otherwise very likely lead to sin; and in this way it often " draws the mind off from things which will harm it to subjects worthy of a rational being." But even in so doing " it does not raise it above nature, nor has any tendency to make us pleasing to our Maker."[5] In some instances the cultural and the spiritual value of an activity may even be in inverse ratio. Theology, when it ceases to be part of liberal knowledge, and is pursued for purely pastoral ends, gains in " meritoriousness " but loses in liberality " just as a face worn by tears and fasting loses its beauty."[6] On the other hand Newman is certain that liberal knowledge is an end in itself; the whole of the fourth Discourse is devoted to this theme. The solution of this apparent antinomy lies in his doctrine that everything, including, of course, the intellect, " has its own perfection. Things animate, inanimate, visible, invisible, all are good in their kind, and have a *best* of themselves, which is an object of pursuit."[7] To perfect the mind is " an object as intelligible as the cultivation of virtue, while, at the same time, it is absolutely distinct from it."[8]

Whether because I am too poor a theologian to understand the implied doctrine of grace and nature, or for some other reason, I have not been able to make Newman's conclusion my own. I can well understand that there is a kind of goodness which is not moral; as a well-grown healthy toad is " better " or " more perfect " than a three-legged toad, or an archangel is " better " than an angel. In this sense a clever man is " better " than a dull one, or any man than any chimpanzee. The trouble comes when we start asking how much of our time and energy God wants us to spend in becoming " better " or " more perfect " in this sense. If Newman is right in saying that culture has *no* tendency

[1] *Op. cit.*, VIII, p. 227, in Everyman Edition. [2] VII, p. 184, 5.
[3] IV, p. 112. [4] IV, p. 111. [5] VII, p. 180. [6] IV, p. 100.
[7] IV, p. 113. [8] IV, p. 114.

" to make us pleasing to our Maker," then the answer would seem to be, " None." And that is a tenable view: as though God said, " Your *natural* degree of perfection, your place in the chain of being, is my affair: do you get on with what I have explicitly left as your task—righteousness." But if Newman had thought this he would not, I suppose, have written the discourse on " Liberal Knowledge its Own End." On the other hand, it would be possible to hold (perhaps it is pretty generally held) that one of the moral duties of a rational creature was to attain to the highest non-moral perfection it could. But if this were so, then (*a*) The perfecting of the mind would not be " absolutely distinct " from virtue but part of the content of virtue; and (*b*) It would be very odd that Scripture and the tradition of the Church have little or nothing to say about this duty. I am afraid that Newman has left the problem very much where he found it. He has clarified our minds by explaining that culture gives us a non-moral " perfection." But on the real problem—that of relating such non-moral values to the duty or interest of creatures who are every minute advancing either to heaven or hell—he seems to help little. " Sensitivity " may be a perfection: but if by becoming sensitive I neither please God nor save my soul, why should I become sensitive? Indeed, what exactly is meant by a " perfection " compatible with utter loss of the end for which I was created?

My researches left me with the impression that there could be no question of restoring to culture the kind of status which I had given it before my conversion. If any constructive case for culture was to be built up it would have to be of a much humbler kind; and the whole tradition of educated infidelity from Arnold to *Scrutiny* appeared to me as but one phase in that general rebellion against God which began in the eighteenth century. In this mood I set about construction.

1. I begin at the lowest and least ambitious level. My own professional work, though conditioned by taste and talents, is immediately motivated by the need for earning my living. And on earning one's living I was relieved to note that Christianity, in spite of its revolutionary and apocalyptic elements, can be delightfully humdrum. The Baptist did not give the tax-gatherers and soldiers lectures on the immediate necessity of turning the economic and military system of the ancient world upside down; he told

them to obey the moral law—as they had presumably learned it from their mothers and nurses—and sent them back to their jobs. St Paul advised the Thessalonians to stick to their work (1 Thess. iv, 11) and not to become busybodies (2 Thess. iii, 11). The need for money is therefore *simpliciter* an innocent, though by no means a splendid, motive for any occupation. The Ephesians are warned to work professionally at something that is " good " (Eph. iv, 28). I hoped that " good " here did not mean much more than " harmless," and I was certain it did not imply anything very elevated. Provided, then, that there was a demand for culture, and that culture was not actually deleterious, I concluded I was justified in making my living by supplying that demand—and that all others in my position (dons, schoolmasters, professional authors, critics, reviewers) were similarly justified; especially if, like me, they had few or no talents for any other career—if their " vocation " to a cultural profession consisted in the brute fact of not being fit for anything else.

2. But is culture even harmless? It certainly can be harmful and often is. If a Christian found himself in the position of one inaugurating a new society *in vacuo* he might well decide not to introduce something whose abuse is so easy and whose use is, at any rate, not necessary. But that is not our position. The abuse of culture is already there, and will continue whether Christians cease to be cultured or not. It is therefore probably better that the ranks of the " culture-sellers " should include some Christians—as an antidote. It may even be the duty of some Christians to be culture-sellers. Not that I have yet said anything to show that even the lawful use of culture stands very high. The lawful use might be no more than innocent pleasure; but if the abuse is common, the task of resisting that abuse might be not only lawful but obligatory. Thus people in my position might be said to be " working the thing which is good " in a stronger sense than that reached in the last paragraph.

In order to avoid misunderstanding, I must add that when I speak of " resisting the abuse of culture " I do not mean that a Christian should take money for supplying one thing (culture) and use the opportunity thus gained to supply a quite different thing (homiletics and apologetics). That is stealing. The mere presence of Christians in the ranks of the culture-sellers will inevitably provide an antidote.

It will be seen that I have now reached something very like the Gregorian view of culture as a weapon. Can I now go a step further and find any intrinsic goodness in culture for its own sake?

3. When I ask what culture has done to me personally, the most obviously true answer is that it has given me quite an enormous amount of pleasure. I have no doubt at all that pleasure is in itself a good and pain in itself an evil; if not, then the whole Christian tradition about heaven and hell and the passion of our Lord seems to have no meaning. Pleasure, then, is good; a "sinful" pleasure means a good offered, and accepted, under conditions which involve a breach of the moral law. The pleasures of culture are not intrinsically bound up with such conditions—though of course they can very easily be so enjoyed as to involve them. Often, as Newman saw, they are an excellent diversion from guilty pleasures. We may, therefore, enjoy them ourselves, and lawfully, even charitably, teach others to enjoy them.

This view gives us some ease, though it would go very little way towards satisfying the editors of *Scrutiny*. We should, indeed, be justified in propagating good taste on the ground that cultured pleasure in the arts is more varied, intense, and lasting, than vulgar or "popular" pleasure.[1] But we should not regard it as meritorious. In fact, much as we should differ from Bentham about value in general, we should have to be Benthamites on the issue between pushpin and poetry.

4. It was noticed above that the values assumed in literature were seldom those of Christianity. Some of the principal values actually implicit in European literature were described as (*a*) honour, (*b*) sexual love, (*c*) material prosperity, (*d*) pantheistic contemplation of nature, (*e*) *Sehnsucht* awakened by the past, the remote, or the (imagined) supernatural, (*f*) liberation of impulses. These were called "sub-Christian." This is a term of disapproval if we are comparing them with Christian values: but if we take "sub-Christian" to mean "immediately sub-Christian" (*i.e.*, the highest level of merely natural value lying immediately below the lowest level of spiritual value) it may be a term of relative approval. Some of the six

[1] If this is true, as I should gladly believe but have never seen proved.

values I have enumerated may be sub-Christian in this (relatively) good sense. For (*c*) and (*f*) I can make no defence; whenever they are accepted by the reader with anything more than a "willing suspension of disbelief" they must make him worse. But the other four are all two-edged. I may symbolize what I think of them all by the aphorism "Any road out of Jerusalem must also be a road into Jerusalem." Thus:

(*a*) To the perfected Christian the ideal of honour is simply a temptation. His courage has a better root, and, being learned in Gethsemane, may have no honour about it. But to the man coming up from below, the ideal of knighthood may prove a schoolmaster to the ideal of martyrdom. Galahad is the *son* of Launcelot.

(*b*) The road described by Dante and Patmore is a dangerous one. But mere animalism, however disguised as "honesty," "frankness," or the like, is not dangerous, but fatal. And not all are qualified to be, even in sentiment, eunuchs for the Kingdom's sake. For some souls romantic love also has proved a schoolmaster.[1]

(*d*) There is an easy transition from Theism to Pantheism; but there is also a blessed transition in the other direction. For some souls I believe, for my own I remember, Wordsworthian contemplation can be the first and lowest form of recognition that there is something outside ourselves which demands reverence. To return to Pantheistic errors about the nature of this something would, for a Christian, be very bad. But once again, for "the man coming up from below" the Wordsworthian experience is an advance. Even if he goes no further he has escaped the worst arrogance of materialism: if he goes on he will be converted.

(*e*) The dangers of romantic *Sehnsucht* are very great. Eroticism and even occultism lie in wait for it. On this subject I can only give my own experience for what it is worth. When we are first converted I suppose we think mostly of our recent sins; but as we go on, more and more of the terrible past comes under review. In this process I have not (or not yet) reached a point at which I can honestly repent of my early experience of romantic *Sehnsucht*. That they were occasions to much that I do repent, is clear; but I still cannot help thinking that this was my abuse of them, and that the experiences themselves contained, from the

[1] See Charles Williams, *He Came Down from Heaven*.

very first, a wholly good element. Without them my conversion would have been more difficult.[1]

I have dwelt chiefly on certain kinds of literature, not because I think them the only elements in culture that have this value as schoolmasters, but because I know them best; and on literature rather than art and knowledge for the same reason. My general case may be stated in Ricardian terms—that culture is a storehouse of the best (sub-Christian) values. These values are in themselves of the soul, not the spirit. But God created the soul. Its values may be expected, therefore, to contain some reflection or antepast of the spiritual values. They will save no man. They resemble the regenerate life only as affection resembles charity, or honour resembles virtue, or the moon the sun. But though "like is not the same," it is better than unlike. Imitation may pass into initiation. For some it is a good beginning. For others it is not; culture is not everyone's road into Jerusalem, and for some it is a road out.

There is another way in which it may predispose to conversion. The difficulty of converting an uneducated man nowadays lies in his complacency. Popularized science, the conventions or "unconventions" of his immediate circle, party programmes, etc., enclose him in a tiny windowless universe which he mistakes for the only possible universe. There are no distant horizons, no mysteries. He thinks everything has been settled. A cultured person, on the other hand, is almost compelled to be aware that reality is very odd and that the ultimate truth, whatever it may be, *must* have the characteristics of strangeness—*must* be something that would seem remote and fantastic to the uncultured. Thus some obstacles to faith have been removed already.

On these grounds I conclude that culture has a distinct part to play in bringing certain souls to Christ. Not all souls—there is a shorter, and safer, way which has always been followed by thousands of simple affectional natures who begin, where we hope to end, with devotion to the person of Christ.

[1] I am quite ready to describe *Sehnsucht* as "spilled religion," provided it is not forgotten that the spilled drops may be full of blessing to the unconverted man who licks them up, and therefore begins to search for the cup whence they were spilled. For the drops will be taken by some whose stomachs are not yet sound enough for the full draught.

Has it any part to play in the life of the converted? I think so, and in two ways. (*a*) If all the cultural values, on the way up to Christianity, were dim antepasts and ectypes of the truth, we can recognize them as such still. And since we must rest and play, where can we do so better than here—in the suburbs of Jerusalem? It is lawful to rest our eyes in moonlight—especially now that we know where it comes from, that it is only sunlight at second hand. (*b*) Whether the purely contemplative life is, or is not, desirable for any, it is certainly not the vocation of all. Most men must glorify God by doing to His glory something which is not *per se* an act of glorifying but which becomes so by being offered. If, as I now hope, cultural activities are innocent and even useful, then they also (like the sweeping of the room in Herbert's poem) can be done to the Lord. The work of a charwoman and the work of a poet become spiritual in the same way and on the same condition. There must be no return to the Arnoldian or Ricardian view. Let us stop giving ourselves airs.

If it is argued that the "sensitivity" which Brother Every desires is something different from my "culture" or "good taste," I must reply that I have chosen those words as the most general terms for something which is differently conceived in every age—"wit," "correctness," "imagination" and (now) "sensitivity." These names, of course, record real changes of opinion about it. But if it were contended that the latest conception is so different from all its predecessors that we now have a radically new situation —that while "wit" was not necessary for a seventeenth-century Christian, "sensitivity" is necessary for a twentieth-century Christian—I should find this very hard to believe. "Sensitivity" is a potentiality, therefore neutral. It can no more be an end to Christians than "experience." If Philippians i, 9 is quoted against me, I reply that delicate discriminations are there traced to charity, not to critical experience of books. Every virtue is a *habitus—i.e.*, a *good* stock response. Dr Richards very candidly recognizes this when he speaks of people "hag-ridden by their vices *or their virtues*" (*op. cit.*, p. 52, italics mine). But we want to be so ridden. I do not want a sensitivity which will show me how different each temptation to lust or cowardice is from the last, how unique, how unamenable to general rules. A stock response is precisely what I need to acquire. Moral theologians, I believe, tell us to fly at sight from temptations

to faith or chastity. If that is not (in Dr Richards' words) a "stock," "stereotyped," "conventional" response, I do not know what is. In fact, the new ideal of "sensitivity" seems to me to present culture to Christians in a somewhat less favourable light than its predecessors. Sidney's poetics would be better. The whole school of critical thought which descends from Dr Richards bears such deep marks of its anti-Christian origins that I question if it can ever be baptized.

C. S. Lewis.

Rosenberg's New Nordic Religion

The military conflict in which we find ourselves unhappily involved to-day is concerned with the physical restraint of certain evil-doers. But it is really part of a much larger conflict, in which we war "not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places." We are opposed to a vast intellectual and spiritual movement or group of movements, which, by debauching scientific method, falsifying history, and substituting bad and erroneous religion for that which is good and honest, is in danger of creating a belt of new paganism stretching from the Rhineland to the Pacific Ocean.

Let us at all costs refrain from deluding ourselves. No military victory can destroy these evils of the mind and spirit. They were growing up long before 1914. They were alive and working below ground between 1918 and 1934. They will still be there, even if the democracies inflict a defeat upon the Nazi arms. They can only be overcome if Christians meet them wearing the panoplia of Almighty God; and part of that equipment is *truth*, with which our loins should be girded.

I

There are numerous features in this vast movement, and it is not the purpose of this article and its sequel to deal fully with more than one. The false philosophy of dialectic materialism is at present less in our minds, although in the event of Russia's power continuing to increase we may hear about it again as much as we did nine years ago.

Here I propose to concern myself with the propagandist writings of Alfred Rosenberg. Rosenberg is regarded by many as a charlatan; but that makes him the more dangerous. To pass him by with contempt is not only to leave the gullible exposed to his influence, but to ignore the power which he exercises in the Third Reich. He is still a comparatively young man, and Hitler has appointed him "Reichskulturleiter," that is to say court philosopher, or guide in matters of theory and principle to the German Government of the moment. His portrait is included in a collection which lies before me, sent for propaganda purposes from Berlin, and this shows that even if he is not Minister of Education, he is of Cabinet rank, and he appears on the page next to Himmler and Lutze, the heads of the S.S. and the S.A. respectively. Though much more influential in his day, his position as a thinker corresponds largely to that occupied by Houston Stewart Chamberlain in 1914. Intellectually, indeed, he is the successor of Chamberlain, in whose *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* are to be found most of Rosenberg's doctrines, at least in embryo. He displays wide if not very accurate learning, and his style has the slashing brilliancy of Feuerbach, and perhaps the same superficiality.

Rosenberg is a prolific writer. His chief work, *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*, comprises 712 pages in the (thirtieth) German edition, and has reached its 143rd thousand. It is, next to *Mein Kampf*, the most powerful piece of National Socialist propaganda in circulation. Besides this he has written a number of pamphlets, a life of Houston Chamberlain, and a further exposition of his own gospel, entitled *Blut und Ehre* (Blood and Honour).

Of these I propose to consider only *Der Mythus*, and more especially to deal with its religious doctrines. It is described by the author as an attempt to evaluate the elements in the spiritual conflict of the present day. In effect it is a sort of "Outline of History"; and although it bears no actual resemblance to the well-known but now out-of-date work by Mr H. G. Wells, it is quite as propagandist as the latter, though of course in an entirely different direction, since Wells wrote in support of the League of Nations. Mankind is surveyed in it from Mesopotamia to the Pacific, and from prehistoric ages to the twentieth century. Whereas, however, Wells based his earlier chapters on the findings of reputable scholars, and only became tendencious when he

drew nearer his own time, and allowed his personal prejudices to affect his estimate of historical personages and movements (and even then suffered his collaborators, Professors Gilbert Murray and Ernest Barker, to record their disapproval in footnotes), Rosenberg allows no such dissentient voices to be heard, and from the outset assumes the validity of the " Nordic myth."

I do not intend to delay myself by a detailed exposure of this fallacious piece of ethnology, since a group of three British scientists has already dealt faithfully with it.[1] But in order to make clearer the fundamental attitude of Rosenberg to Christianity, and also his treatment of Meister Eckehart, I must perforce summarize the " myth " as briefly as I can.

Rosenberg's thesis is not entirely his own invention. Its source is to be found in a work by the French Count Joseph de Gobineau (1816-22) entitled *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines*. In this book occurs for the first time the claim that there are permanently superior and inferior groups of human beings, and that the so-called " Aryan " races are pre-eminent in their superiority. Another Frenchman, Lapouge, in the year 1899 carried the doctrine further, and introduced the phrase " Nordic race " to describe these princes of humanity. At the beginning of the present century an East Prussian, Gustav Kossinna, took up the same idea with alacrity. It is also, of course, easy to discover in the pages of Nietzsche, and many will remember how much we heard of his phrase " the great blond beast " in the year 1914.

As set forth by Rosenberg, the claim is somewhat as follows. In an area not exactly definable, but perhaps somewhere in the region of what is now south Russia, or alternatively round the shores of the Baltic, there developed in early times a pure breed of human beings who are described by anthropologists as " proto-Nordics." These people showed themselves from the first to be endowed with exceptional gifts, gradually penetrated all parts of the East and West, and have made themselves the ruling class in every land whither they have migrated. All the great leaders of humanity, all the best craftsmen, poets, inventors, philosophers, and religious leaders, can be shown to have

[1] *We Europeans*, by Julian Huxley, A. C. Haddon, and A. M. Carr-Saunders. Now to be had in a cheap edition in the Pelican Books.

been of " Nordic race." The trusteeship of humanity has therefore been vested by Almighty God in Nordic hands, and this should be recognized by all the other peoples of the world.

What, we must needs ask, are the actual facts? The extravagance of the claim should not blind us to the elements of truth which it contains. The emergence of the proto-Nordic breed of human beings is accepted by reputable ethnologists, as also the high birth-rate of its members, and their swarming in what we may call the days of proto-history as well as in historical times. Moreover, it is also accepted as established that proto-Nordic dynasties and aristocracies have in the past conquered and ruled in many parts of the world, especially those inhabited by the Eurasiatic peoples (Alpines in Europe). Thus we find the proto-Nordic Mitanni in the Middle East dominating a non-Nordic population, and giving a queen to Egypt and perhaps the Davidic dynasty to the Hebrews. It is admitted that another branch invaded India from the north-west, and there established ruling castes, who dominated the Dravidian and pre-Dravidian peoples of that great country. Of the typical Nordic features—long head, fair or yellowish hair, blue eyes, and tall stature—the first and last are usually dominants in crossing with Mediterraneans, the second and third in crossing with Alpines. Thus intermarriage usually produces in the one case a dark race of big-framed folk, in the other a fair but stocky broad-headed population. The Nordic is pugnacious and roving. He is a heavy eater and drinker, does not survive well in a hot climate, and cannot or will not compete by the side of other races in manual labour.

What, however, is left out of this ethnological scheme is the biological and cultural effect of hybridization. The invaders, in spite of possible efforts in India, have seldom succeeded in keeping their race pure, and even where they have succeeded they have succumbed to three inevitable facts: first, the difficulties of living in the tropical zone; second, the fact that the perfectly pure Nordic, however good he may be at " bossing " other people, has very definite limitations in intellect; third, the fact that the ruling race tends to rule itself out. Aristocracies do not maintain their numbers. What we discover therefore is that, apart from the obvious physical results mentioned above, the most notable intellectual and cultural achievements in countries

where there is a Nordic element in the population have not and do not come from the pure Nordic stock, but from the intermarriage of Nordics and non-Nordics, and from culture-contacts between them.[1] This law of the result of hybridization applies everywhere, and is not confined to the particular crossings just mentioned. Thus the brilliant developments in Sumeria and the Indus valley, as also in Egypt and in Greece, seem clearly to have been in each case the result of the contact and intermarriage of separate branches of the human stock. Even in India, where it might have been supposed that the rigid caste system would have guarded against hybridization, there are very few Brahmins who do not show signs of Nordic-Dravidian, or even of Nordic-Dravidio-Australoid crossings, and none of the great achievements of Indian architecture, religion, or philosophy can be set down to the credit of undiluted Nordic activity. By himself the Nordic is restless, energetic, imperious, brave; but he is not creative. He is better at administration than at invention or speculation. Large-scale statistical experiments have shown that university students of Nordic appearance are less intelligent than those of other classifiable groups. It is the crossing with alien stocks which brings the striking results, and such crossing may be with Semites as much as with Alpines or Mediterranean dark whites.

It is, however, not merely on the score of its ignoring the effects of hybridization that we must reject the thesis which Rosenberg has re-edited for the German youth of to-day. We must reject it for two definite falsifications.

First, it is false in claiming that there are inferior races, whether white or coloured. Rosenberg speaks more than once of non-Germanic peoples as inferior,[2] and he sneers at the Chicago Eucharistic congress of 1926 for allowing what he calls "nigger-bishops" to celebrate Mass. He cannot endure that "Nordic human beings," "Levantines," "niggers," Chinese, and Eskimos should have a common worship, and he equally abhors the idea of a common humanity, as "freimaurerisch," the invention of freemasons.

[1] Rosenberg's assertion that Dante was a German is not quite correct. His father was an Italian of the family of Caccaguida, his mother a German (Aldiger).

[2] He stigmatizes the Czechs as undisciplined and petty-minded, and groups together the various branches of the Eurasiatics (Alpines, Dinarics, etc.) as possessing a lower conception of freedom than the Nordics.

Let us set against this the considered opinion of the Rev. A. G. Fraser, formerly Principal of Achimota College, West Africa, who, from long and varied experience of educational work in the mission field, has more right than most to speak on this matter. He says:

" Our blood is divided into four classes, A, B, C, D. These classes are equally divided amongst all races everywhere—in the Congo, in China, in Berlin. I may interchange blood with an African or Chinaman when I dare not do it with my cousin. I have had to teach pupils of twenty nationalities or more, and I have not found the children of any one superior in natural ability to another. There are no inferior races; backward races there are. These will come on as they get opportunities of mixing with others, and of sharing in the stock of our common knowledge."

The above conclusion is endorsed by Professor J. B. S. Haldane, who can hardly be charged with a bias in favour of either Freemasonry or Christianity, and who stresses the inequality of individual human beings, but not that of races.

Secondly, Rosenberg's thesis is false in claiming that the Nordic peoples are specially gifted and endowed with genius. After what has already been said, it seems unnecessary to elaborate the refutation of this statement. Suffice it to add that most of the fundamental discoveries on which civilization is based appear to have originated in the Near or Middle East, among peoples who by no stretch of imagination could be called Nordic or presumed to have but the faintest admixture of Nordic or even proto-Nordic genes (thus making a fair allowance for hybridization). Aristotle certainly regarded the Nordics of his day as, on the evidence then available, less intelligent and skilful than the Asiatics, and the cross-bred Greeks as superior to both. Hardly any of the great British explorers were Nordics, while the most distinguished Germans have been of the round-headed variety (these being Beethoven, Kant, Schiller, Leibnitz, and Goethe). Napoleon was a Mediterranean, and Shakespeare was certainly of hybrid stock. Germany alone, not to mention other countries, has greatly benefited from the genius of her best Jewish elements—one need only mention Mendelssohn and Einstein. The bulk of Germans to-day are of the broad-headed Alpine type, and of the portraits before me very few show pure Nordic features. Hitler and Goebbels in particular are most un-Nordic. The assertion

of Rosenberg that the principles of empirical science are solely a Nordic discovery will not stand close investigation. Some of the worst obscurantism is to be found among Nordic Ulstermen; indeed among the fair blue-eyed peoples biblical fundamentalism flourishes. Free thought does not seem specially encouraged under Nazi rule, and some of the most acute scientists of modern times have been of Jewish or Celtiberian stock. Empirical research is actually stimulated by Jewish-Christian prophetic monotheism, which encourages the belief that the world is under unitary control and rationally ordered, and therefore capable of being investigated as a cosmos or orderly and intelligible system. The most we can say, and it is a concession of great importance, is that the type of language spoken in isolation by the proto-Nordic peoples is of such flexibility that the different varieties of it, as they developed, have become incomparable vehicles for the conveyance of ideas, and have thus proved a benefit to those non-Nordic peoples who have adopted them as a medium of expression.

The reason for the foregoing summary of the case against the Nordic myth may now be stated. It lies at the back of Rosenberg's hostility to the Christian religion. That he is bitterly hostile cannot be doubted. The traditions of many generations make it hard for him to turn his back on the historical Jesus, but like his predecessor, Houston Chamberlain, he retains our Lord only in order to pick from His teaching just as much as he happens to approve of, and insists that He was really a Nordic, probably of Amorite or Mitannic descent, and thoroughly un-Judaic. Apart from this, he rejects almost everything that Christianity stands for, and abuses it whenever he can, mainly, it seems, because of its association in the past with non-Nordics, especially Jews, and with what Houston Chamberlain first called the "chaos" of "Mediterranean mongrels." Christianity stands for love, humility, self-denial, compassion, whereas the Nordic race stands for honour, dignity, self-assertion, and pride. (St Paul would perhaps have said "the natural man.") Rosenberg evidently regards the mission of Boniface from this country to Germany as the beginning of a long period of slavery for central Europe, and confuses its methods, which were pacifist and persuasive, with those of Charlemagne, which were militarist and coercive. Anyhow, the memory of the conversion rankles, and Rosenberg regards it as the intrusion of Syro-African-

Etruscan-chaotic superstition, devoid of any idea of honour or duty, and says that it bound the free Germanic spirit in fetters. There is a shrewd thrust at ecclesiasticism, which must bring shame to some of us, in his gibe that the Gospel of Love has often been disseminated by an organization devoid of love.

Rosenberg, however, has no great belief in love of one's neighbour.

> " The desire to free another from suffering is a purely personal sentiment, and embodies no element of actual strength for the creation of a nation or state. . . . No one has ever in earnest demanded the sacrifice of a whole state or nation for the love of another to which it stands in no direct relationship, and no army has ever fallen in battle for such a cause."

We may recoil in disgust and indignation before the revelation of a man's mind contained in this kind of statement, but do not let us underestimate its importance. Remember the circulation of this book in Germany, and realize that it only puts into words what must be in the minds of many Germans. Artillery will not avail to cast out such selfishness. If we British Christians are worth our salt, we must tackle this false doctrine in the only way in which it can and ought to be tackled, by prayer and loving service, by fair argument and honest persuasion, and the work will be ready to begin only when this present war is ended.

Rosenberg's contempt for the early Church is greater and more virulent than that of Mr Wells. Doubtless it had its faults; but it surely shows no sign of deep insight to dismiss the creed of Nicæa as merely " carried by a majority-vote of monks who for the most part could neither read nor write." He makes much of the existence of fundamentalism in both Catholic and Protestant circles, and is not a great admirer of Luther, who in spite of his greatness he condemns for creating a new ecclesiastical system, not quite but nearly as bad as the old, and for calling Copernicus a swindler and deceiver because the " magical Bible " did not agree with the teachings of the astronomer-canon. Both Catholics and Protestants, he says, are naturally embarrassed by the discrepancies between the Bible and science, and therefore resort to dishonest subterfuges in order to make it appear to believers that their creed is not really disturbed, whether in the matter of creation on the one hand, or of the bodily

Resurrection on the other. He deprecates the fatal attachment of the Church to past history, and insists on the importance of God being "der Gott der Gegenwart" (the God of the present), thereby revealing his lack of any proper knowledge of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit.

But his worst venom is reserved for the Jews. The attachment of the Old Testament to the presentation of the Gospel of Jesus is for him the supreme disaster. It is the blight upon Lutheranism, which has prevented it from completely freeing the German spirit from bondage. The legacy of Israel is to be rejected, not merely because it is bequeathed to us by a Semitic people who are obnoxious to Nordics. It is rejected because the prophets of Israel taught universalism, and so paved the way for a Catholic Church which would impose a single religious system upon superior and inferior races alike, and force them to be brothers. (The ex-Kaiser is reported to have said once, "Humanity for me ends at the Vosges." Rosenberg and his friends would seem to say that it ended at the Vistula.) The Old Testament is also rejected because Yahweh stands for transcendence, whereas the Germanic spirit, like that of the Aryans in India, finds truth in immanence and pantheism. This is a very dubious conclusion. Indian pantheism is partly the fruit of climatic, partly of cultural conditions, and is not necessarily a Nordic product, since its Brahmin expositors were and are of mixed race. Moreover, no good reason is given why, on a pantheistic scheme, God should be more immanent in the Germans than in the Czechs and Poles, unless forsooth a doctrine of Karma is to be introduced, so that a bad German is reborn as a Slav!

The New Testament hardly fares better than the Old. Our Lord was, we are told, as touching His humanity a Nordic (the truth being that He was after the flesh probably the outcome of hybridization in an earlier generation between Semitic and non-Semitic stocks). But the Jesus of Q is rejected as being the product of a community composed of slaves and the dregs of the Mediterranean world. Only the Jesus of Mark, or rather of Ur-Marcus, can be accepted, because He is "alive with fiery opposition." The command to turn the other cheek and the prohibition to resist evil are evidences of feminine traits of character, and therefore unhistorical. Only men with the minds of bastards could invent and value such injunctions! Granted, the fundamental teaching of Jesus is love. Yet, says Rosenberg,

any genuinely German religious movement which desired to develop into a truly national Church would have of necessity to insist upon the subordination of love of one's neighbour to the satisfaction of national honour, and no activity of that Church could be approved which did not place the security of the nation before everything else. Hence the unfaltering demand that the ties of state-citizenship should come before those of Church-membership.

All this is at any rate frank, even if blasphemous, and it shows how very far Rosenberg and his friends have moved from genuine Christian discipleship and sound scholarship. Nevertheless with all his aberrations it is difficult to call Rosenberg anything other than a Christian heretic of an extreme anti-Roman Protestant type. He vehemently repudiates materialism, and insists that religion is unscathed by science, since it is really concerned not with history but with the realm of the highest values; and in one place he speaks of the historical Jesus as Divine Revelation.[1] But is he sincere? What we seem to view is natural and unregenerate humanity seeking to wrest the Scriptures to its own advantage, and to dictate its own terms to the Christ who invites it to come to Him. Such a spectacle is painfully familiar to any who have worked as pastors to redeem individual souls. What is so terrible here is to see the religious spokesman of a whole great nation trying to parley with its King and Saviour.

Rosenberg's hatred for the Church of Rome resembles that of Luther in his most vehement and radical mood, and perhaps that of our own Charles Kingsley; and with some of his criticisms one can hardly disagree. The old difficulties over indulgences, the Petrine claims, the doctrine of merit, and the infallibility of the pope remain for us as much as for him, and it is still a cause for complaint that Roman Catholic moral theology and political scheming display at times too much of the wisdom of the serpent, and too little sense of the importance of honour and fair play. But in these matters it is hardly safe for the supporter of recent Nazi policy to throw stones, since some of them are bound to come back and hit him. He is, as we shall

[1] Actually, he distinguishes between "a Revelation" and "a Revelation once-for-all or unique." He seems inclined to place our Lord in the former category, and so to make room for the idea of subsequent revelations, leading logically, no doubt, to the supreme blasphemy (not, it is true, uttered here), "Hitler ist Wort Gottes."

see, on still more debatable ground in attacking the medieval Church for its condemnation of Eckehart. Moreover, it is significant that Rosenberg quarrels even with German Catholicism at its best. He spends much space in denunciation of the distinguished Jesuit scholar Fr Erich Przywara, whose rich and carefully balanced treatise on philosophical theology he rejects because it exalts the transcendent God: "This Being," says Rosenberg, "is only the Jewish Jehovah under another name, and the latter is as defunct as Wotan!"[1] Karl Adam is also the object of a coarse attack, and finally Cardinal Faulhaber is abused, more particularly on the ground that in 1928 he explicitly condemned excessive nationalism as sin. Pacificism, especially in its Catholic form, must, Rosenberg says, be rooted out at all costs.

Grace is another of his bugbears. He makes great play with the saying of Eckehart about the soul being "above grace," and is in fact ultra-Pelagian. It is only too clear that as used by Rosenberg "Ehre" should be translated not by "honour" or even "self-respect," but rather by "self-esteem." The idea of being God's servant, dependent upon His favour, is a Jewish idea, derived especially from Paul, via Rome and Wittenberg, but does not figure in the teaching of Jesus, who speaks of our being "friends," and who unquestionably regarded the union of the soul with God as constituting salvation and the goal of life. There is a half-truth here, and we see in this tirade the inevitable result of Barth's exaggerating the destruction of the *imago dei* in mankind—namely, a reaction which leads to a total denial of sin.[2]

Speaking generally, Rosenberg's attacks can only be effectively met by a reasonable and moderate modernism. Anything really reactionary is vulnerable to his thrusts.

(*To be concluded.*) A. C. Bouquet.

Our Possessions

In the October number of Theology Mr Warren dealt with some methods for making the corporate worship of the average congregation at Morning and Evening Prayer

[1] This is inconsistent with the statement on p. 127 (G.E.) that Yahweh is still alive and active under other names. [2] P. 71 (G.E.): "To a people with an unimpaired racial character the doctrine of original sin would be incomprehensible, for in such a nation there lives a secure confidence in itself and in its own discovered destiny."

more real. With the views he put forward I have no quarrel whatsoever. When Morning and Evening Prayer are treated as " services," that is to say when they provide means of worship for the average churchgoer, who may be very ill instructed and often almost completely uninstructed, the parish priest may rightly feel that the traditional setting of hymns, sermon and intercessions is not very well suited to the needs of his particular flock. My purpose is to suggest a supplementary line of thought which may lead to a better appreciation of these services regarded in their character as " offices."

For Morning and Evening Prayer are the Divine Office of the Church of England, which are to be said by all the clergy in private, if not in public. They are based on the Latin Office of the pre-Reformation Church and, *qua* offices, follow its general principles. But as they stand in the Book of Common Prayer this character is obscured by the introduction (sentences, exhortation, general confession and absolution) and the prayers after the third collect, which seem to represent an attempt to make the " office " (intended for the clergy and a few devout lay people) into " services " suited for the general public. It is with the character of the intervening part of the " service " from the Lord's prayer to the third collect—*i.e.*, the Office proper—that this paper deals.

Its structure in terms of the thought of the sixteenth century is fairly obvious. After a brief introduction we praise God in the words in which He inspired the pious king David to pour out his soul to God. This is followed by a reading from the Old Testament, intended as a type or prophecy of the New, or as a history of God's preparation for it. Between the First and Second Lessons we have one of the traditional canticles; they are put there because the position roughly corresponds to that of the Te Deum in the old office, and the Magnificat is put in the same place at Evensong in order to balance the structure of the two offices. (It must be remembered that Evening Prayer is partly based on the old Vespers and Compline but more on the Cranmerian Morning Prayer.) Then we have the Second Lesson, describing the fulfilment in the Gospel of all God's preparation of mankind, and the establishment of the Church on earth in the apostolic age. This is followed by another of the historical canticles of the Church and a fairly brief closing section composed of the Creed, in

which the Church professes its faith in the Gospel which it has heard, and the prayers and collects.

With this part of the service Mr Warren hardly dealt at all, except to suggest a greater variety in the permissible variations of lessons and Psalms. I have no objection to his demand for a wider variety; the revisers of the lectionary seem to me to have made a very poor compromise between the two possible views: (*a*) that the aim is to read as much of the Bible as possible, and (*b*) that the most valuable parts of the Bible should be read.

The result is that the lectionary is far too long, and that a large number of the Sunday lessons, though valuable enough for those brought up in the old-fashioned tradition of Bible reading, are entirely unsuited for modern times. (On one Sunday after Trinity there is no alternative to the story of the refusal of Shadrach, Meshech and Abednego to worship King Nebuchadnezzar, and their delivery from the burning fiery furnace; one is tempted to wonder whether any member of the revising committee had been educated at one of our residential public schools. Anyone so brought up knows that this lesson, with its grotesque list of musical instruments, offers more scope for blasphemy than the rest of the Bible put together, while the story, which the ordinary man naturally supposes is intended to be history, offends him as grossly improbable. I would not exclude this great story of faith from public reading in church; but there should be an alternative for congregations which are not, as a whole, familiar with the Bible, and I am afraid that means about 75 per cent. of the whole.)

Yet another result is that the ordinary man, who knows a little about the difficulty of accepting the Bible as literal historical truth, and is inclined to interpret that to mean that the Bible is not true, is staggered to find the clergy reading in public things which they know to be untrue and often unedifying. Consequently I do not in any way wish to oppose Mr Warren's plea for greater variety, to which I would add one for greater brevity, in regard to the Lectionary.

But I would add a plea also that the parish clergy should realize more clearly what an incomparable treasure they possess in the Office, if they will use it aright. Let us look at it a little more closely. The structure of the original type of Psalm is very simple. The worshipper describes the misery in which he finds himself as a result of the magic

of his enemies or of the anger of a god or gods whom he has offended knowingly or unknowingly. He identifies himself with his god (in virtue of preliminary purifications and promises of sacrifice) and proclaims in narrative, which is intended as a " magic " to produce the effect it describes, the coming of his god to deliver him. The effect is produced and the sufferer, now delivered, bursts into a pæan of thanksgiving to the god who has saved him. Here we have a form of Sumerian prayer or magic, at a level where the two are barely distinguishable, which had behind it a history as long as the interval which separates the Church of to-day from the Crucifixion, when Abraham started on his adventurous pilgrimage from Ur of the Chaldees. Not all the Psalms follow this pattern. We have court poems and hymns to celebrate royal marriages and births, coronation odes and celebrations of victory, narratives of the story of the Exodus, pious meditations and so on. But the original form is well represented; and it is not amiss to notice that it was not one of the more highly developed Psalms, but one of the most primitive type that furnished the Lord with His last words upon the Cross.

From this we go on to the First Lesson. Once again a little acquaintance with anthropology and historical criticism shows the Old Testament as the story of man's gradual rise from the most barbarous forms of primitive religion up to the heights of Jewish prophecy. The whole evolution of religion is to be found within its pages. The old view of literal inspiration, if pressed to its logical conclusion, implied that God's attempt to prepare Israel for the Incarnation was a remarkable failure, since Judaism on its face value represents the religion of the Old Testament quite as accurately as Christianity. If, on the other hand, we take the modern view we see man's gradual ascent under the guidance of God from the lowest stages to the highest that he can achieve for himself apart from the Incarnation. We see how much it is. We pass from such stages as Abimelech's slaughter of his brethren on one stone and the massacres of the people of Canaan, to Malachi's prophecy of a time when in every place from the rising of the sun to its going down the worship of man will be offered to the one God, who calls on man to love Him with all his heart and soul and strength and to love his neighbour as himself. It is a colossal achievement; and yet a colossal

failure; the last words of the Old Testament are the warning, " lest I come and smite the earth with a curse."

Yet it is immediately after this that the Church bursts into her song of triumph. The Te Deum is a paraphrase of the song of the angels at Bethlehem; the Magnificat proclaims the Incarnation in the words of Mary herself. And so we go on to hear of the life and teaching of the Incarnate Lord and the preaching of the Gospel by His disciples. God comes upon the scene to fulfil the old order and to replace it by the new; and we offer Him our thanks in the Canticles, which tell how the light has blazed forth in the darkness, and call upon the worshipper to remember that it is his duty to " go before the face of the Lord and to prepare His way by giving light to them that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death."

Now it is perfectly easy for the clergy to acquire a knowledge of the general background of the Old Testament. Such a book as Professor E. O. James's *The Old Testament in the Light of Anthropology* is an admirable introduction, and the fact that the lectures, of which it is composed, attracted a wide general audience, shows that the laity are interested in such things. I am inclined to think that occasional sermons or courses of sermons on such questions would prove a welcome change to many parishes. But my main purpose is to urge that the meaning of the structure of the offices of Morning and Evening Prayer should be explained to the ordinary congregation on the lines I have attempted to describe. The form of these offices ought at all costs to be retained, whatever rearrangements of the setting may be found desirable; in this latter there is room for the widest liberty. The actual details should indeed be improved by a more judicious appointment of alternative Psalms and Lessons. But as a structure it should stand, for it provides in the compass of a single service the whole story of man's redemption. And it reminds us, as more " topical " services sometimes fail to do, that though the waves of the sea are mighty and rage horribly, yet the Lord who dwelleth on high is mightier.

Wilfred L. Knox.

A Parish Priest in the Eighteen-Thirties

So much interest is felt in the problem of the condition of the English Church before the Tractarian Revival that a brief account of a forgotten book, describing a faithful priest whose ministry saw its beginnings before 1833, may be welcomed by some readers. The book is called *Practical Religion Exemplified by Letters and Passages from the Life of the late Rev. Robert Anderson, Perpetual Curate of Trinity Chapel, Brighton* ; the author was his wife, the Hon. Mrs Anderson. It was published by Rivingtons, apparently for the S.P.C.K., whose book-list is bound up with my copy (sixth edition, 1855).

Anderson was ordained in 1821 by the Bishop of London, having been Assistant Professor of Oriental Languages at the East India College, Haileybury. In 1825 he became Proprietor and Perpetual Curate of Trinity Chapel, which, formerly a Dissenting Chapel, was consecrated in 1826. He and his wife were well-to-do people. They had a butler and a number of servants, which could not have been maintained on the salary of the minister. (In 1847, when F. W. Robertson went there, the income was £300 and the congregation consisted mainly of tradesmen and servants.) He stayed there till his death in 1843.

We are struck by his intense piety. Even as a boy, " when he returned from school, instead of the foolish presents generally made by boys, he brought his sisters Young's *Night Thoughts* and Milton's *Paradise Lost* " (p. 152). At Brighton " he always rose at six o'clock, that he might contemplate the rising sun, which faced his window; and feeling his heart warmed by the Sun of Righteousness, prostrated himself, like Daniel of old, in humility before his God and Saviour " (156). To his five children he was a loving father, pouring out his soul in long letters to them whenever he was absent; the subjects of the letters were generally details of biblical exegesis and explanations of the Catechism. A sentence from a letter of 1841 illustrates the difference between then and now. " You have often heard me speak of the good Archbishop Leighton; and his observations on this point are so admirable, that I shall here repeat them to you . . . " (131). The most devout of clerical fathers to-day would shrink from such conversation, for fear of boring his children and setting them against

the Church. Family prayers were held at 9 a.m. and 10 p.m. Afraid of wearying his household, he seldom exceeded a quarter of an hour on each occasion. So orderly was he that he could lay his hand on any book or paper in the dark, so friendly that he invariably left his study door open to invite visitors. Never until his last illness did he fail to dress for dinner. His favourite authors were George Herbert, Jeremy Taylor, Donne, John Smith, and above all Keble, whose *Christian Year* was published in 1827.

The unconscious class-feeling of the age is betrayed in his remark about servants: " Our relation to those beneath us is meant as a faint emblem of the relation in which God has seen good to place Himself with regard to us "; also children " should be taught to feel that they cannot do without servants " (51). His care for the souls of the servants is illustrated thus: " It was his custom on Sunday morning to give them each a tract, which he took the greatest pains to select, carefully avoiding all unsound and exciting doctrine " (173).

Now here it would seem is a typical Evangelical, in spite of the unusual choice of favourite authors. But such a judgment is not borne out by what follows. In an undated extract from his diary, but in any case prior to 1832, we read that " Mr S. described the change in his mind since his attendance at Trinity Chapel, from Latitudinarianism to Catholicism " (159). When he first went to Brighton he was considered Low Church. He was accused of having become a High Churchman as a result of the Tracts. However, he was able to prove that his views on doctrinal points had undergone no change by referring to a sermon of 1826 and to a pastoral letter of 1832 which told the congregation how he had fulfilled the pledges of 1826. As the Tracts began to be published in 1833, they had no bearing on the point (199).

Anderson seems to have said the daily offices at home (37). We read of " frequent communions, both on week-days and on Sundays," a service every Wednesday, and a Sunday School teachers' instruction once a month, " reading them passages from the most approved divines, Leighton, Hooker, and others of the same kind, and closing with an exposition of Scripture and a Prayer " (222). Sermons were composed with great care, the writing of them being spread over four days, Monday to Friday; after a while the manuscript was left behind (232).

Writing to his brother, he recommends weekly Communion if the opportunity is given at the church he attends. For himself he says, " It might occasionally happen that my bodily frame would really be unequal to three hours' intense devotion." To obviate this difficulty, he longs for the institution of early celebrations (200-1).

To show his pastoral zeal, we are told that as many as thirty callers would come in a morning; visits up to fifteen were paid in the afternoon; and he went out freely in the evening, presumably to the better-off members of the congregation, always however returning for family prayers at 10 p.m.

Lastly I must transcribe a passage on Confirmation, which is strikingly different from the usual account of pre-Tractarian ways (211).

" The mention of our Bishop [Otter, 1836-1840] brings me to the subject of the Confirmation which took place yesterday at St Peter's church. Though only two years have elapsed since our last Confirmation, there were 830 candidates for that holy rite: and nothing could be more admirable than the order with which the whole was conducted. The vicar, in full canonicals, walked at the head of each file, as they approached the table, and his curate, also in full canonicals, headed each file as they returned to their seats. The effect was very striking, as we followed these shepherds with their little flocks, moving silently along the different aisles of that beautiful church; while the good Bishop, as the representative of our Lord, stood with love in his heart, and blessings in his hands, to animate and encourage these followers of the Lamb, for their approaching encounter against the enemies of their salvation ! I am greatly in hopes that, of the ninety-nine whom I examined and recommended for Confirmation, almost, if not entirely, all will approach the Lord's table next Sunday; and after having thus completed this blessed portion of my ministerial labours, which has occupied me for nearly two months. . . ."

The fullest description of the practice of Confirmation since the Reformation is found in Canon Ollard's essay in the composite volume *Confirmation : I. Historical and Doctrinal* (S.P.C.K., 1926). There we read that " definite preparations for receiving Confirmation had ceased to be, in the later eighteenth century, a regular feature of the Church in England, and that candidates, at least of the educated

classes, prepared themselves " (212). " Bishop Wilberforce . . . was above all the Remodeller of the practice of administering Confirmation, and the rite, which had reached the lowest depth of slovenliness and disorder in the early nineteenth century, was, owing chiefly to his practice, raised to a height of reverence and devotion which it had rarely, if ever, attained before within the period with which this essay is concerned " (221).

Bishop Wilberforce was consecrated Bishop of Oxford in 1846. The passage from Anderson's Life quoted above shows that, in regard both to earnest preparation and reverent administration, great improvement had taken place, at least in some places, before the Tractarian Revival had had time to influence the Church.

W. K. Lowther Clarke.

Mass-Observation and Religion

" Mass-observation " as a method of social survey is being popularized as a valid method of testing the temper and " reactions " of the public to any policy or proposal which is put before them. It is rumoured that the government in this and other countries is contemplating the employment of this method on a large scale, and, while there may be some doubt as to its value, it should yield some interesting data, not least to those interested in the progress and position of religion.

The method was originated in 1937 by two men, Charles Madge and Tom Harrisson, and when *Britain by Mass-observation* was published in the " Penguin " series early in 1939 there were already two thousand observers at work. Its originators claim that their method gives a scientific view of human nature, unattainable by the ordinary modes of social study. They are two young men whose careers should equip them for useful research. One, Tom Harrisson, is an anthropologist of experience, who has accompanied several scientific expeditions and expresses the view that the technique of anthropology should be applied to civilized and not only to backward peoples. He is an Old Harrovian and has so little reverence for the Old School Tie that he pronounces the savage natives of the Pacific

islands to be " at least as civilized and pleasant as Old Harrovians." His collaborator, Charles Madge, is a Winchester man, a poet and a journalist. This should afford a strong combination, but actually the result is a little disappointing. There is no sign of literary grace in the bald and jerky record of impressions: a rather flat style is diversified though not improved by such silly expressions as the dictum that the historian of the future " will be a typically lousy historian."

The authors' aim is objectivity: they want to present a bird's-eye view of the people and an honest transcript of the people's reactions. Instead of what the " handful-who-know " think of the masses, they want the masses to say what they, the masses, think. It cannot be said that the writers achieve complete objectivity. They have their own prejudices, like other people, and these persist in obtruding themselves in a strong anti-Chamberlain complex and a scarcely veiled dislike of religion.

Nevertheless, there are some illuminating remarks which it will be profitable to note. The first is the real importance of mass-observation. " If only because industry requires an army of technicians and semi-technicians, universal education has become a social necessity." Hence the time must come, though it has by no means arrived yet, when the people will claim to decide what they want, instead of accepting what the intellectuals think is " good for them." It is just here that we see the profoundly disturbing spectacle of a future in which one of two things may happen. Either the mob will rule, or it will hand over its power and give *carte blanche* to a dictator. Hitler is reported as saying, " I know that every one of a people of millions agrees with my words and confirms my view."

We pride ourselves that " Britons never will be slaves," and imagine that it would be impossible thus to put ourselves in the hands of any individual leader. The alternative, however, is even worse, if we accept the position adopted by our authors. They would demand " ochlocracy," or government by the mob. And they proceed with relentless accuracy to show what a poor, feeble, thick-witted Caliban the mob is. The accounts of observations made in a London district (" Metrop ") and in an industrial city (" Worktown ") reveal a pitiably low mental level. Decreasing interest in politics is noted as a significant sign of the times (we observe that at the time of greatest tension

last year, when far-reaching issues hung in the balance, only 37 per cent. voted at an election where a big poll was confidently expected). This lack of interest is interpreted by the observers as a sign of distrust of the Press. This is not surprising when we read of this enterprising effort by the *Herald*. This journal had a caption during the crisis of September, 1938, "The Average German does not want War." Then followed what was described as a scene in a typical German café, with people quietly enjoying themselves and no trace of war fever. But the central figure in the photo was a *Daily Express* staff reporter with his Belgian wife ! The same picture was used later by the *Daily Mail*, but the *Express* "blew the gaff."

Disillusionment with the Press is accompanied by disappointment with politicians. Labour is particularly inept. A Labour M.P. on Saturday, September 17, 1938, said, "Here am I, a member of Parliament, and I am impotent. There is nothing I can do." Labour held a "great" meeting in "Worktown," the Empress Hall being half full. "They consistently misjudged public opinion and were always about two days too late." When a "great" meeting of protest was arranged in "Worktown" after the annexation of Austria, it was held in the "Co-op. Hall" three weeks after the crisis. Total present: 100.

Lower depths await us. We may sympathize with the decrease of faith in politicians and the cynical attitude towards the Press, but we were scarcely prepared to find the same lack of interest in science. Interviewers asked a large number of working folk about their attitude to science. Nine per cent. were hostile to it. Thirty-nine per cent. were completely indifferent. A man of thirty alluded to scientists as "them crack-brained blokes wot write books." "Not in my line, pickin' dogs is what I do in my spare time," declared another. "Not for the likes of us," said a third. Another put it more epigrammatically, "Scientists are fellers who spend their time thinking how to find out things we can do without." A librarian says that scientific books never go out, unless they are pseudo-scientific thrillers. Religion has to wage war with indifference, but people are not more indifferent to religion than to the other interests enumerated. Probably there is more generally diffused and steadily maintained religious interest than any other kind of preoccupation, but there is a growing impatience of all serious concerns. A story of

Canon Peter Green, dating from his days in South London, is appropriate. Visiting in Walworth, he encountered an elderly woman, whose interest he vainly attempted to enlist. At length she summed up her attitude in a sentence: " Me an' me 'usband we don't take no interest in nothink ! "

Even that is preferable to the three manifestations of popular interest which fill the remainder of the book. The first of these is superstition. It will come as a shock to many to realize that the horoscopes, which occupy a large space in many daily papers, are taken seriously by thousands. Of the women who were interviewed by the investigators, one-third believed in the predictions, another third partly believed and a third were sceptical. Men, on the whole, were unimpressed, though some thought there was " something in it." And spiritism is notably on the increase, as shown by some of the comments recorded.

The next example given of mob mentality is that of the interest in what is euphemistically called Free Style wrestling, which is experiencing a remarkable vogue in " Worktown." This is described in a way which makes one realize that blood-lust and cruelty were not banished with the gladiators. A wrestler is described as " shouting in agony " when his opponent grabbed him by the hair and doubled him up with a thrust of his knee, gouged his eyes and pinned him to the floor. Nor is all the excitement on one side of the ropes. The crowd shouts, " Dirty rat—swine—bastard—lousy pig——" and hurls lumps of chalk, lighted cigarettes, and even a small iron bolt at the object of their disfavour.

In this " sport " it is not skill so much as thrill that counts. Only a small " gate " rewards the more scientific " catch-as-catch-can " wrestling. People like to see men who can stand more than they can themselves, and they are ready to cheer a favourite and boo an opponent. If the referee fails to favour their champion they demand a fresh referee. They don't like a heavy-weight referee because a heavy man can't be thrown out of the ring !

This is " sport " !

Our estimate of the mob is not raised by the next chapter, which records the opinions of a representative number of working people on the subject of " The Lambeth Walk." It may be, as one observer says, the ceremonial dance of the Seminole Indians ! It may be a perfectly harmless free-and-easy hop. But many of its accompaniments are of a character which would lead the observer to form a

lower opinion of working folk than even the atrocious sport described earlier.

So far, the reader will have formed the impression that the British working folk are a class which can certainly not be trusted to control its own destinies. In fact, an uneasy suspicion begins to form that this elaborate inquiry is really a camouflage, that the book is really a tract in favour of dictatorship. Contempt for the workers is apt to result from the implication that their interests are limited by Hollywood on the one side and Littlewood on the other.

We need not accept so depressing a verdict. It is not always remembered that the victim's replies to his questioner may be a long way from his real feeling. A " snap " question may elicit a stupid answer. Again, people will often say what they think the interviewer expects them to say, and Cockneys will often pull his leg. They act the part of the Fat Boy and delight to " make your flesh creep " with tales of orgies that are non-existent. Also, as the writers notice, the nearer a crisis approaches, " the more necessary it is for people to put up a psychological defence in order to carry on with their daily lives. They *have* to hope for the best."

The concluding section of the book, in which the writers patronize religion in a few condescending paragraphs, offers some food for thought. They more than once make the curious remark that English religion " continues to emphasize an intervening deity without reference to Christ," and apparently attribute this to the fact that Mr Chamberlain is a Unitarian ! This is a good example of the usefulness of their observations and the less valuable character of their deductions. They are right in thinking that the average man tends to emphasize " the Almighty," " the One above," " Providence," without reference to Christ. Is not the national hymn, " O God, our help in ages past," practically Unitarian ? Some may be inclined to attribute this to the Reformation; it is certain that where the Church and the Saints have been dropped out, and faith in the Incarnation has weakened, the tendency among the indifferent is to eliminate all but a vague theism.

There is one more manifestation of the public " intelligence " which should not go unremarked. With the decline of allegiance to " the Churches " and the waning of old political loyalties, there has grown up a curious and menacing series of labels and attachments which have

escaped the attention of politicians and intellectuals. The prototype of these was the Frothblowers. Then there came the American craze, the Flute Club, which swept the States with its absurd hierarchy of Big Toot, Grand Toot, Super Toot and Grand Blast. Every member has a little flute, and as he enters the room he toots a few notes and is answered by his fellow-members. " That is simply a burlesque," we are inclined to comment. Not altogether. It is an expression of the wish to fraternize. All sorts of mushroom " clubs " have come into being, some with famous names like the Western Brothers or Gracie Fields as patrons, some frankly advertising techniques like the League of Ovaltineys, complete with theme song. Football Pools have thousands of members of so-called friendly groups. " The Happy Family grows greater and forges stronger links of friendship week by week," says one leader. It would seem difficult to form any real friendship with such a slender link, but if there were a common bond of belief and a common program something might come of it. It is to the credit of the Rev. W. H. Elliott that he has seized this psychological fact and floated the League of Prayer and Service with its 800,000 members. " With this modern technique, new and potentially powerful groupings are being formed, almost unnoted, throughout the whole structure of English society." Almost everybody wears a badge. It may not imply much, beyond membership in a society, but it is just that which is important.

" The more we are together
The happier we shall be "

is the expression of this desire to be incorporated in something, no matter what.

There are lessons for the Christian statesman in all this. It is a reminder that Democracy is not " government by the mob, but government by the wise with the consent of the mob." If the picture here given is correct, no greater disaster could happen to any country than to entrust its destinies to those who are a prey to superstition, influenced by brutal thrills, captivated by what is unworthy, amenable to exploitation of the most obvious kind.

The Christian will have to resist the temptation to contempt. He will not say that these pictures represent a permanent condition; man is emerging, though more slowly than the optimistic Victorians hoped; and, as Bishop Gore,

echoing St Augustine, used to say, " We must judge man not by what he is, but by what he is becoming." It will need the vision of a new St Francis to love the people and to clothe the truths of religion in forms that will appeal. The freedom and adaptability of the Church of England should produce the appropriate techniques for each age and bring out of her treasure things new and old.

MARCUS DONOVAN.

The Sacrament of Confession in the Eastern Orthodox Church

THE ever-increasing contacts between the Christian East and the Christian West have enriched the experience of both sides and considerably widened their spiritual horizon. This is especially noticeable in such spheres of Church life as sacramental practice. The Eastern and Western interpretations of the sacraments are distinct, though complementary, and when the two are put side by side and compared a much more balanced outlook is achieved. The truth of this statement can be tested even by its application to such a controversial question as the place of a human agent in the act of divine forgiveness. There is nothing more complicated than the drawing of a line between the healing action of a priest empowered by the divine promise of the remission of sins (St John xx, 23) and the undesirable penetration of one human being into the secret chamber of another's soul, especially when the latter is undergoing the purifying process of sincere repentance. The East and the West have developed two different solutions of this perplexing problem, and this has deeply affected both their theory and their practice of confession.

The whole attitude of the Eastern Christian to this sacrament is based on the conviction of the interdependence and mutual responsibility of all the members of Christ's Body. A Christian who sins violates the divine law of love and harmony and therefore he damages his own being, those who are the immediate victims of his evil doings and, more than that, he inflicts a blow upon the whole community of mankind, especially upon those who have been regenerated through baptism and brought into the fellowship of the Church through confirmation. St Paul's words, " And

whether one member suffer, all the members suffer with it" (1 Cor. xii, 26), reveal the depth of that organic unity which keeps the whole human race together and makes its spiritual welfare dependent on the individual efforts of its members. This mutual responsibility extends even beyond humanity and has its repercussions in the life of the whole creation. Human egoism, the dullness of our imagination and the limited scope of observation prevent most people from seeing the real consequences of their sins. It is already an achievement if a man is capable of realizing the sufferings of those individuals who are directly hurt by his sin, and it is quite an exception when a Christian is fully aware of all the effects of his wrongdoings upon the life of the whole Christian community. It means that an ordinary person has no weapons at his disposal for dealing adequately with sin, for he cannot even see clearly its causes and all its consequences. The Church alone possesses the means for the disentanglement of this confused situation. It does it by suggesting some practical steps to its members, which may help them gradually to eradicate sin and to paralyse its disintegrating influence.

In the East the sacrament of confession begins with a reconciliation between the penitent and those who have suffered most from his sins. The general custom of the Orthodox Church is that the penitent before going to see the priest visits his relatives and closest friends in order to ask them to pardon him. It is left entirely to the discretion of the individual whether he specifies his guilt or leaves it unsaid. Those who are approached usually reply by saying, "God pardons you"; they refrain from taking upon themselves the right of absolution which belongs to God alone, but they make it clear that as far as they are concerned no bad feeling or resentment is left in them.[1] Only when this part of the act of repentance is completed does an Eastern Christian go to church and there make his solemn confession of sins.

[1] One of the deep impressions of my boyhood were the days of confession in Russia before the revolution. On that occasion my parents and we children had to ask one another's pardon, and the same was done by all the other members of the household. My father and mother asked the servants to forgive them, and the servants addressed the same request to all of us. It was always an occasion when the common Christian background was realized by all and our membership in the Church of Christ was made real.

The underlying idea of this is the belief that a sincere inward repentance and even a reconciliation with those who had been directly wronged by us are not sufficient. There remains the rest of the Christian community which also suffers from the sins committed by each individual, and it is necessary to put right also this side of the account. Therefore the act of confession was originally made publicly, and although this practice is now reserved in the East for exceptional circumstances,[1] the whole Orthodox method of confession has faithfully preserved its original design.

The penitent does not kneel, but stands beside the priest facing eastwards. For the latter is regarded less as a judge than a witness representing the Christian community. The penitent confesses his offences directly to God, helped and encouraged by the prayers of the Church. This is made clear by the priest, who addresses the following admonition to the penitent before the latter begins to confess his sins: " Behold, my child, Christ is invisibly present to receive thy confession, be not therefore ashamed or afraid, and conceal nothing from me: but without equivocation tell me whatsoever thou hast done, that thou mayest receive forgiveness from our Lord Jesus Christ. Behold his image before us; I am only a witness to testify before Him whatsoever thou shalt say unto me: but if thou concealest anything from me, thou shalt have double sin: take heed, therefore, since thou art come for the medicine, that thou goest not unhealed away."

The form of confession itself is left entirely unregulated; every penitent follows his own inspiration. Some priests ask questions in order to make the process of self-accusation easier, others refrain from all questions. When the penitent has declared all he intended to say, the priest reads the following prayer: " O Lord God of the salvation of thy servants, merciful, gracious, and long-suffering, who repenteth thee of the evil, and willeth not the death of a sinner, but rather that he should be converted and live: Forgive now, O Lord, this thy servant (by name); grant him the assurance of repentance, pardon and remission of his sins, and absolve him from all his offences, voluntary and involuntary; reconcile and unite him to thy holy Church through Jesus Christ our Lord, with whom be power and

[1] There was a revival of public confession in Russia in the first years of the Communist rule.

glory ascribed unto thee, now and for ever, even unto ages of ages. Amen."

The prayer ends with an absolution, which is different at present in the Russian and in the Greek Church. The Russian absolution is: "May our Lord and God Jesus Christ, through the grace and compassion of His exceeding love, forgive thee, my son (here follows the Christian name of the penitent), all thy transgressions, and I, an unworthy priest, by the power that is given unto me by Him, forgive and absolve thee from all thy sins in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. Amen."

This form of absolution was introduced into the practice of the Russian Church in the course of the seventeenth century under Roman Catholic influence. The Greeks have preserved the original, which expresses much better the Eastern conception of the priest's part in the process of repentance and forgiveness. The Greek absolution is as follows: "May God, who pardoned David through the prophet Nathan when he confessed his sins . . . may the same God, through me a sinner, pardon thee everything in this world, and cause thee to stand uncondemned before His awful tribunal."

The most striking feature of this absolution is the absence of any reference to the power of the keys which has always played such a prominent part in the life of the Church of the West. The comparison between the confessor and the prophet Nathan is no less significant, for Nathan, technically speaking, was a layman who was used by God as an instrument for the stimulation of the spirit of contrition in King David. The Orthodox interpret the priest's part in confession along similar lines. He appears in it under two different aspects: on the one hand he is God's messenger whose task is to remind the sinner of God's omnipresence and omniscience; on the other hand he is a fellow-sinner who, through the warmth of his loving compassion, helps the penitent to arise from his spiritual prostration and to renew his struggle against sin. Some Russian theologians, especially the well-known Metropolitan Anthony of Kiev († 1936), built up their whole interpretation of the Redemption on the basis of the voluntary fellow-suffering of the Son of God with sinners. According to Metropolitan Anthony every Christian, and especially every priest, is called upon to walk along the same path and participate in the work of Redemption through sharing the burden of sins committed

by others. A priest can help the sinner, if he is ready to partake in the suffering and humiliation caused by sin. This part of the priest's office finds its most explicit manifestation during confession. An Orthodox priest does not distinguish himself from the penitent; on the contrary, the graver the case, the closer the identification between him and the sinner. Not infrequently, for instance, the priest and the penitent will kneel together and the priest will fervently entreat God to forgive their common transgressions, to open their minds and hearts, and to grant to them both the spirit of repentance. He thus takes upon himself the weight of the crimes committed by his fellow-Christians. This closely intimate relation between priest and penitent finds its expression even in the external behaviour of the confessor, who usually puts his hand on the penitent's shoulder and by means of kind words and gestures tries to express his loving affection for his brother in Christ suffering from sin and desirous to find release from it. The priest in the Orthodox Church is clearly a physician, and like any good doctor he is even keener than the patient himself to see him completely recovered. He is determined to use all the means at his disposal for the achievement of this desirable goal. It often happens that the priest enters into a very intimate discussion with the penitent which touches various aspects of life, only indirectly related to the sins which are being confessed. There are no rules regulating the scope and character of these talks; they depend entirely on the priest and the penitent, and on the type of relations which exist between them. The Western method of a concise statement of the circumstances of the sin relevant to its guilt, with the concluding formula of confession in which a penance is asked, are unknown in the East. The penance is not considered an integral part of confession and is seldom given. Its use is restricted to the cases when the will of the penitent specially needs to be strengthened in the struggle against sin, or the depth of his grief for the sins committed desires to find expression in some act of reparation and mortification, which the penitent does not want to impose upon himself by his own decision. Otherwise the priest never exercises the rôle of judge, assessing the penitent's conscience, and he is therefore free from any danger of weakening the sense of personal responsibility in those who resort to confession. The frequency of confession is left to the discretion of individuals. The general recommenda-

tion is to make it four times a year. In the Russian Church no priest will communicate anyone unless the latter has very recently been to confession. In other Eastern Orthodox Churches this close connexion between communion and confession does not exist. In some Churches—*e.g.*, in Serbia and in Bulgaria—the confession is usually made only when grave sin has been committed.

The classification of sins into mortal and venial, although it has found its way since the eighteenth century into the manuals of moral theology taught in theological colleges, is of Western origin and has never affected the practice of penance in the East. The spirit of spontaneity and of informal converse with God in the presence of the priest is the main characteristic of the Eastern confession.

Summarizing these observations, we come to the following conclusions. The Eastern practice emphasizes more the corporate aspect, whilst the Western lays a greater stress upon the hierarchical aspect of penitence. Both methods have their advantages and their limitations. The Western is more precise, and provides a better school of discipline; the Eastern is vaguer and less uniform, but it gives greater prominence to the family spirit and personal freedom, these essential aspects of the life of the Church. This is the probable reason why the East has never known that revolt against confession which has been such a striking feature of Western Church history. Finally, the Eastern system contains a most valuable means for the education of Christians in the realization of their organic interdependence; it contains a very efficient cure against that excessive individualism which has made the life of the Church barren and dry in some of the Western denominations. A greater knowledge of the different practices of confession can widen the experience both of the East and of the West and enable them to use more wisely confession, this most powerful instrument against the destructive influence of sin. A better acquaintance with the Eastern tradition is of a special value for the Anglican Communion, which is still unable to arrive at an agreement on this important matter. Some of the objections raised by the Evangelicals against the practice of confession lose their point when this sacrament is seen in the light of the Eastern method, and that is the reason why the Orthodox Church may be of some use for the settling of some of these disputes. Its whole temperament is sacramental and yet free from clericalism.

The world of to-day is suffering from a renewed attack of sin, which reveals the strength of its hold upon individuals and nations. Its collective character is especially clearly displayed at present, and the powerlessness of isolated efforts to check it is made obvious. In this time of anxiety and crisis the Christian Church in its efforts to help its members to fight against evil finds one of its best weapons in the sacrament of confession. Its proper use will be achieved only when the unity of the Church is restored, but even while this ultimate object is still out of reach it is essential for the welfare of the Church that Christians should feel more deeply their oneness. There is no better way of stressing their unity than a readiness to incorporate into their daily life those best fruits of the Christian experience which have been faithfully preserved and cultivated by the members of other confessions. It is time for the Christian East and for the Christian West to realize that they have one common foe—the sin and depravity which undermine the creation; and one Lord and Master—Jesus Christ, the incarnate Son of God.

NICOLAS ZERNOV.

The Church and the War

A letter by Professor Karl Barth to a French pastor, editor of "Foiet Vie," translated by Pastor Ernst L. H. Gordon and Reginald H. Fuller, members of the Queen's College, Birmingham.

December, 1939.

As you say in your letter, three-quarters of the French theologians whom I had the privilege of meeting and with whom I had the privilege of working in Bièvres in January this year are today serving your country in a military capacity at the front or elsewhere. You invite me to send to them and to my other friends in France a message through *Foi et Vie*. I do so with great pleasure, since it gives me the opportunity of telling you what moves me at this present time as I think of you all.

Our situation here in Basle is such that we cannot possibly shut our eyes to the war. Only a few kilometres from here the fortifications begin. On the right are the German fortifications and on the left the French. The pilots of both sides are, I am afraid, in the habit of forgetting that they

have no business in the air above our heads. It has even happened that certain undesirable objects have fallen from above upon our territory. In the midst of our streets the barricades and barbed wire of our defences bristle ready to meet an even worse menace. Such are the circumstances in which I have to expound the peaceful mysteries of Christian Dogmatics, just now the Doctrine of Predestination.

But what is that compared with the problems and cares which are your concern to-day—you yourselves, your families, your congregations and the whole Reformed Church of your land? You may rest assured that I myself and many others in our still " neutral " part of the world realize what turmoils and hardships, what sacrifices and temptations events have brought and continue to bring to you. We know, too, that we are bound as Christians to share with you and with everyone in the belligerent countries in your anxiety and affliction: and we do this from the bottom of our hearts. You will not, dear friends, misinterpret the fact that we Swiss form at present an island of " neutrality " from a military point of view. At the moment there is no other possibility. The causes of the present war lie in the international decisions of 1919 in which our country did not take part. And since that date (as before) high politics in Europe have developed without our co-operation. Switzerland would become guilty of the same arbitrary methods in politics, the curbing of which is the task of to-day, if she voluntarily disregarded her repeatedly declared policy and entered the war as a belligerent without the compulsion of external pressure. For the moment we have a duty towards the whole of Europe—the duty of preserving the integrity of that piece of European order which has been entrusted precisely to us in the form of military neutrality. You will agree with me when I say that it is necessary and salutary for all nations, and not least for the Church of Jesus Christ in all nations, that there should be, as long as possible, such places through which it is possible to maintain contact between men and Christians in some sort of tranquillity. Such a place is Switzerland for the time being. " Neutrality," interpreted in this sense, is laid upon us as an obligation for the time being. This neutrality signifies, not that we dissociate ourselves from The Event of our time, but that we associate ourselves with it in our own *particular* way. It signifies the special form of *our* responsibility in Europe. There are probably few Swiss who under-

stand our " neutrality " in any other sense. At any rate I should like it to be known that I personally understand it in this sense and in this sense alone.

There can be no doubt that this war is for all of us, for belligerents and neutrals alike, a very special war, that it bears a totally different character from the war of 1914 and from nearly all the wars of previous centuries. France and England hesitated long (perhaps too long, but when one considers the grim character of this *ultima ratio*, this hesitation was certainly justified) before they took up arms to put an end to the arbitrary use of the law of might (" Faustrecht ") which the present German Government has openly proclaimed and put into practice with ever-increasing unscrupulousness. After having made Germany from end to end a land of fear and terror, Hitler's National Socialism has become to an increasing extent a menace to the whole of Europe. This menace has led to an awakening. In the midst of the sin and shame of all nations there still remains, through the goodness of God, something of law and order, of free humanity, and above all, and as that which gives its meaning to all else, of freedom to proclaim the Gospel. Where Hitler reigns, even this remnant is destroyed. But Hitler is not satisfied to reign in Germany alone. When this last fact became sufficiently clear for even the blind to see, war came. " Il faut en finir !" said your Prime Minister in the hour of decision, and his English colleague repeated this declaration. The question as to how deep this resolve and this determination go may safely be left to the sense of responsibility of these statesmen. It is certain that every Christian too, who has followed the last years with his eyes and ears opened, must, just because he is a Christian, give his own Yes and Amen to this " Il faut en finir !" Undoubtedly, France and England have had in the past, and still have, their own imperialistic motives for waging this war. That, however, does not make any difference. Our generation would be answerable before God and before men if the attempt were *not* made to put an end to the menace of Hitler. In the end war remained the only means of achieving this purpose. France and England had to undertake the task, because they are chiefly responsible for the state of affairs which arose in Europe after 1919—because they are responsible, too, for making Hitler possible. But, now that they have undertaken the war, it cannot well be denied that in this war not only the interests of France

and England are at stake, but also those of *all other* nations —in the end even the interests of the German nation itself. Herein lies the peculiarity of this war. It has arisen from the mortal jeopardy of all, and it must be waged in the defence of all. We " neutrals," too, are not neutral in so far as we know full well that the efforts and the sacrifices of this war are necessary to preserve for *us* too what is more indispensable for life than life itself. Our French and English friends, and our German friends as well, should know that we are grateful to those who, in accordance with their historical position and responsibility, have taken upon themselves the waging of this war against Hitler.

The Church of Jesus Christ cannot and will not wage war. She can and will simply pray, believe, hope, love, and proclaim and hearken to the Gospel. She knows that The Event by which we poor men are succoured in an effectual, eternal and godly way has come, comes, and will come to pass, not, according to Zech. iv, 6, by force of arms or by power or by any kind of human effort and achievement, but only by the Spirit of God. The Church therefore will not see in the cause of England and France the " causa Dei," and she will not preach a crusade against Hitler. He who died upon the Cross died for Hitler too, and, even more, for all those bewildered men who voluntarily or involuntarily serve under his banner. But precisely because the Church knows about justification which we men cannot attain by any means for ourselves, she cannot remain indifferent. She cannot remain " neutral " in things great or small where justice is at stake, where the attempt is being made to establish a poor feeble human justice against overwhelming, flagrant injustice. Where this is at stake, there the Church cannot withhold her witness. It is the command of God that justice be done on earth: it is precisely for this purpose that God has instituted the State and given to it the sword; and, despite all the shortcomings of which it may otherwise be guilty, the State which endeavours to defend the right proves itself precisely by these endeavours to be a Just State, and may claim the obedience of everyone. It would be regrettable if the Christian Churches, which in previous wars have so often and so thoughtlessly spoken the language of nationalism and of militarism, should just in this war equally thoughtlessly decide to adopt the silence of neutrality and pacifism. The Churches ought today to pray in all penitence and sobriety for a *just* peace, and in

the same penitence and sobriety to bear witness to all the world that it is necessary and worth while to fight and to suffer for this *just* peace. They certainly ought not to persuade the democratic states that they are, so to say, the Lord's own warriors. But they ought to say to them that we are privileged to be *human* and that we must *defend* ourselves with the power of desperation against the inbreaking of open inhumanity. The Churches owe the duty of witnessing to the Christians in Germany as well as to the whole German nation: Your cause is not just! You are mistaken! Have no more to do with this Hitler! Hands off this war! It is his war alone! Change your course while there is yet time! Why have the representatives and organs of the ecumenical movement preserved so diplomatic a silence in all these years, and even during the fatal developments of this summer and autumn, as if there were no prophetic ministry of Jesus Christ, and as if the Church had no duty of watchfulness? Why have we heard and why do we continue to hear, and that not infrequently, voices of an eschatological defeatism, a defeatism which, appealing to the truth that "the whole world lieth in the evil one," busies itself almost cynically with asserting that Hitler's present adversaries for their part are no saints either? The apprehension of the truth that God alone is holy will not excuse us from the duty of putting up a resistance to-day. On the contrary, the Church in every land will have to give much comfort in the dark times upon which, according to all appearances, we are entering. The Church, however, will only be able to give real *comfort* if she can also, without hatred or phariseeism or without any illusions concerning the goodness of any human beings, give *admonishment*, if she will earnestly and frankly say that to-day resistance is necessary.

And it will be particularly the Church of Jesus Christ that will at the same time no less clearly recognize and proclaim that other truth, that the ultimate in war—and in this war especially—cannot be war. War is like a painful yet purposeful surgical operation; it can only be waged in order to help, to heal and to secure life. The time may very soon come when there will arise in every country the urgent necessity of bringing this aspect of the matter into the foreground.

My dear French friends, you know how closely I am associated with Germany, with her Church and with her

people. You will, I know, not take it amiss, if I ask you both individually and collectively, to concern yourselves even now with the question of what ought to happen if the disaster which Germany has brought upon herself is manifested in her defeat, a defeat which according to all human calculation is inevitable. At the beginning of the war the slogan was announced that the war was not directed against the German people but only against its present rulers. This was a noble formula, but it was an over-simplification of the problem. The new slogan, however, that every people gets the government it deserves, and that the whole German people must be held responsible for the actions of its government, is again too simple. The truth lies somewhere between these two poles. The German people are not wicked as a people, are not at any rate more wicked than any other people. The idea that to-day they must be punished as a whole is an idea which is impossible both from a Christian and from a human point of view. But Hitler's National Socialism is most certainly the wicked expression of the extraordinary political stupidity, confusion and helplessness of the German people.

Let me just sketch the causes and the real significance of this fact as I understand them: The French people and the English people are no more " Christian " as a people than are the Germans. But the German people suffer from the heritage of a paganism that is mystical and that is in consequence unrestrained, unwise and illusory. And it suffers, too, from the heritage of the greatest Christian of Germany, from Martin Luther's error on the relation between Law and Gospel, between the temporal and the spiritual order and power. This error has established, confirmed and idealized the natural paganism of the German people, instead of limiting and restraining it. Every people has just such an heritage from paganism and from certain Christian errors which have strengthened this paganism. Consequently every people has its evil dreams. Hitlerism is the present evil dream of the German pagan who first became christianized in a Lutheran form. It is a particularly evil kind of dream, a dream which endangers the life both of the Germans themselves and of the rest of us as well. Apart from the torment which it has caused the dreamer himself, this dream has made the dreamer a menace for Europe. He must in the first place be rendered harmless.

It is essential that those who now face the German as

an adversary in war and all who may later find themselves face to face with him (if they will themselves think as Christians and not as heathen) should not lose sight of the fact that in this adversary they have to deal with *a sick man.* Particularly when the war is over—and even now we cannot devote too much thought to what must be done when the war is over—it will become necessary to treat him as a sick man is treated. Very firm yet very compassionate hands will then be necessary. Of course, it will be imperative to render physically impossible any further developments on the fatal course which leads from Frederick the Great through Bismarck to Hitler. It will be even more imperative to make manifest to the German people an illustration of that political wisdom which as yet is so foreign to them. By this I mean that there must be created for them *conditions of life* of such a kind that they will be prevented from going on dreaming that evil dream in some new form or other. The illusion that they can only stand their ground against other nations by terrorism must be eradicated from them by an unconditional resolve on the part of these other nations to *do justice* to Germany's real needs as they are conditioned by her geographical situation. That does not mean that Germany should be granted the freedom to become what Bismarck and Hitler wanted to make her. But it does mean that Germany should be granted the freedom to live by her own labour. It cannot be said that this freedom was granted to her in 1919, or in the period from 1919 to 1933. It is for this reason that every nation has its share in the responsibility for the rise of Hitlerism. I myself lived in Germany at the time of the occupation of the Ruhr, and, after that experience, I know what I am saying. It may be that the coming peace will have to be sterner than the peace of Versailles, sterner both politically and militarily. But it will have to be a wiser and a juster peace if all that we have gone through is not to be in vain once more. If this peace is to be wiser and more just it will have above all to show *more care and consideration.* We shall have to allow the population which occupies the wide area of Central Europe and which is set at such a disadvantage through the limitations of the natural resources of this area, to share in the means of life which other more fortunately situated nations enjoy. This must be done in such a way as will allow Germany to renounce that fatal course and to bring out her peculiar gifts—there can be no doubt of their wealth

and significance—so that she may become to herself and to the other nations a blessing and not ever and again a curse.

The long entertained desire to give Hitler " a chance " proved dangerous. But it would prove still more dangerous if, after the war, no readiness were shown to give the German nation an honest chance. The mistake of 1919-1933 must not be repeated. The present resistance to the German menace would otherwise be from the very outset without meaning. Otherwise it would be even physically impossible to destroy the German menace by political and military resistance. This is what people in France, too, should clearly realize.

But, my dear friends, I think it would be very unchristian and therefore very imprudent if we pondered all these considerations without at the end making the frank confession that man proposes—and it is man's duty to propose—but God alone disposes. We can and we should shoulder our responsibilities, our political responsibilities and, if need be, our military responsibilities. But it does not lie with us to determine what will be the eventual issue. And in no circumstances should we have the right to marvel or to complain if the issue were wholly different from the hope and intention, the plan and resolve which we envisage at present. The outcome of this war is not to be predicted with absolute certainty by any calculation of man. I have no need to remind you that Germany is a doughty adversary. You must not think merely of her *capacity for military achievement*, but perhaps still more of the almost unaccountable *capacity for suffering* which the German people possess. This last is one of the best features of their natural and Lutheran heritages. And somewhere behind Germany stand the great enigmas of Russia, and of Italy too, enigmas which may find their solution in this way or that. Even if human calculation gave a hundred per cent. certainty, we as Christians have to remind ourselves that there are such things as " miracles of the antichrist," absolutely unexpected and astounding achievements of the " beast out of the abyss," which God has His own grounds for permitting, the occurrence of which could for the time being bring to nought all the calculations, not only of the " rational " portion of mankind but also of the Church and of Christians, be these calculations never so well grounded. We do not know whether Hitlerism is not capable of such a miracle —there is much in its development hitherto which tends in

this direction. Perhaps a question mark is yet being set over against that admirable resolve, " Il faut en finir." Perhaps the nations of Europe may be destined to resist this enemy in vain and finally to have to live a life of dishonour under the rule of undisguised Lie, a life comparable to that of men and Christians in Germany to-day. We are defending ourselves against this menace. We ought not to grumble if this threat were to become an accomplished fact despite all our wishes. We must realize that we shall then receive the due reward of our deeds. The use we all have made of that heavenly gift, that remnant of a free humanity, of democratic justice, and above all of the freedom of the Gospel, has not been such as to oblige God to preserve us from destruction. If we are preserved, it will be only by His grace. Are we prepared to be forced to recognize His grace even perhaps in His *not* preserving us ? Are we prepared for a situation in which the defenceless confession of Jesus Christ is the only course left open to us ? Are we prepared even then and under such conditions to remain loyal to our God and to rejoice in Him and to find our dignity in this and in this alone ? On our answer to this question depends our title to defend ourselves now, depends our right to have a clear conscience in so doing, and our right wholeheartedly to ask God for His assistance. We must be prepared for God, just when we are acting in obedience to His command, to confront us with *His own* " Il faut en finir," and again by His command to lead us to something *wholly other*. We must be prepared to adhere *to Him* then and especially then, resolved upon a new obedience. Done in this spirit of preparedness, our work of resistance will then be a good work. Then and only then can it be offered with joy and confidence. We are both allowed and obliged to know that God will reign in any case and that He makes no mistakes.

When this letter reaches you, my friends, it will soon be Christmas. Then we, together with the whole of Christendom, which is poor and yet so rich, and with all the angels in heaven, shall be privileged to rejoice in the presence and kingly rule of Him who is our salvation and blessedness wholly and in every situation. As the people that walk in darkness, we see a great light. That our duty and privilege is—each in his own place—to watch, to stand fast in the faith, to quit us like men and to be strong—let that be our message to you this Christmas. KARL BARTH.

MISCELLANEA

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CORRESPONDENCE

ECCLESIASTICAL TRANSCENDENTALISM?

To the Editor of Theology.

Sir,

I am grateful to Mr Heywood and Mr Belgion for their criticisms of my previous letters. I find Mr Heywood's particularly difficult to answer, because we seem to be at cross purposes.

In his first paragraph Mr Heywood appears to meet the application which I gave to the distinction between moral law and gospel by simply denying that the distinction exists; from which it follows of course that the Church can have no distinct function in regard to each. "There are not two factors involved, but only one—the utterance and act of the living God. . . ." Are we to conclude then that the fact that God has revealed Himself in two Testaments is unimportant?

In his next paragraph Mr Heywood draws far-reaching deductions from certain sentences of mine isolated from their original context. When I wrote that in a juster order of society the Church would have a better chance of propagating its gospel and bringing men to repentance, I meant, so far as I can judge, just what I said, in opposition to the false notions (*a*) that social reform can bring a millennium, and (*b*) that otherwise the Church has no real interest in social reform. I did not mean either (*a*) that in present circumstances the Church

cannot propagate its gospel and bring men to repentance, or (*b*) that the bringing men to repentance is not a help and an inspiration to social reform, or (*c*) that the Church is merely an ambulance. I cannot see how any of these deductions follow from what I said.

As to my assertion that "a man cannot take the gospel-view of sin until he has already believed the gospel," the next sentence in my original letter shows the meaning to be that only in the light of gospel-faith can sin be thus seen. Why should this statement imply any "disjunction between penitence and belief"? If I say that I must have light before I can see a certain object, do I imply any disjunction between light and seeing or between light and the object seen, or that there must be an interval of time between the coming of light and the act of seeing?

As to the question of prophesying, of course the Church must prophesy, but I think it ought to prophesy the truth in reference to the absolute moral difference between human actions as well as to the other absolute difference between God's holiness and man's sin. Mr Heywood apparently thinks that prophesying implies ignoring the former difference in order to concentrate on the latter, and that therefore the Church need have nothing to say on the question whether it is or is not an absolute duty to fight—except perhaps that the only absolute duty is that which is acknowledged through a direct and conscious apprehension of God's will by the soul. Thus the Church can wash its prophetic hands of all responsibility for those nasty, crude, practical, doubtful decisions which ordinary men have to take. The issue, as we both agree, is so important that I am sure Mr Heywood will forgive me a little violence of language. Leaving on one side the absolute moral difference between actions, as he does not admit it, I would only entreat him to remember that it is the function of a truly evangelical Church to wash the disciples' feet, not its own hands. The Son of God revealed Himself by coming down to earth, and His Church cannot follow Him simply by retiring into the clouds of heaven. An apparent ascension may be really an escape.

Mr Belgion's criticism is very different. His assertion that the commonly acknowledged moral standards of Europe remain unchanged and unshaken by Nazi and Communist revolutions is, I fear, a little too naïf to be convincing. I only hope he is right. If his judgment proves to be sound and mine to be what he thinks it, a piece of cheap journalism, all Christians will rejoice.

Mr Belgion's demonstration of my inconsistency would have been more effective if he had not somehow omitted to notice (though his quotations are accurate), that I said (*a*) that all *commonly acknowledged* moral standards (not simply all standards), had collapsed, and (*b*) that it is by the *absolute authority* (not the

content) of conscience that men everywhere, however imperfectly, apprehend God's moral law.

Yours, etc.,
OLIVER C. QUICK.

CHRIST CHURCH,
OXFORD.
January 12, 1940.

[This correspondence is now concluded.—ED.]

ANGLICAN THEOLOGY

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

I should like to venture a few comments on the most interesting articles of the Archbishop of York, the Rev. E. L. Mascall and Dr Selwyn which have appeared in three recent issues of THEOLOGY. Of the three I liked Mr Mascall's the best —because, I suppose, I felt in most agreement with it and understood it the best. There is, however, one general question which I wish to raise even about it. But first may I say something about the other two?

The Archbishop recognizes a gap between the pre- and post-war theologians. The gap is due to the two different worlds of these two epochs. The pre-war world was one whose thought was impregnated with the idea of universal—and practically automatic—progress towards perfection, while the present epoch is characterized by disillusionment and a sense of divine judgment. Naturally theological thought is affected by the change. The Archbishop expresses two main problems for the theologian to-day—viz., "to think out afresh what are the standards of life to which a society must aim at conforming if it is to be in any sense a Christian society"; and, "the need to recover our apprehension of the Gospel alike in its essence and in its impact upon ourselves and the world." I think the Archbishop is guiding us aright here, but he does not show us how he himself would proceed. In fact, he asks some further questions which show that he hesitates as to the basis upon which to proceed—What is the content of revelation? Are there revealed truths, or is revelation always given in events? The Archbishop is too faithful to pre-war thought to take up the answer that would be offered by the younger theologians, as described by Mr Mascall.

In Dr Selwyn's article we find practically a refusal to acknowledge any gap at all. Dr Selwyn does recognize, no doubt, a shift of interest back to the Bible. The modern movement marks, he says, "both a recognition and a resolve—a recognition that the Higher Criticism . . . had yielded as much as could be expected of it, and a resolve that the primary purpose of Christian theology—namely, the study of the Bible as the

record of divine revelation and the repository of the truth of God's redemption of mankind—should once again occupy its true place in the life of the Church." But for Dr Selwyn—so one would judge from his article—this does not necessitate any real break with pre-war Anglicanism, or indeed with Anglicanism throughout its earlier history. He concludes: " In face of (the need of to-day) Christian civilization must bring out its whole resources—its heritage of liberty and imagination bequeathed by Greece and its heritage of law bequeathed by Rome no less than its heritage of religion derived from Palestine." Could anything be said more in the spirit of that pre-war sense of satisfaction and belief in synthetic progress? In other words, does not Dr Selwyn here seem to lay himself open to the charge that he fails completely to see how inadequate such a " gospel " is to the world of to-day—or indeed of any day?

Now I do not imply by this—no doubt rash as well as bold—criticism of Dr Selwyn that I am following the neo-Calvinistic denunciation of Nature and all " natural " products of human civilization, and demanding a theology of grace which shall be utterly and absolutely contrasted to such nature; but I am voicing by this criticism the feeling that unless the Bible has some distinctive message of its own, and a message which, alone and unaided by any other human system of thought, is able to give salvation, then we are of all men most to be pitied.

It is doubtless now clear why I liked Mr Mascall's article the best. He gives expression, in many respects, to my convictions. My questions on his article are mainly concerned with drawing out the consequences of what he says.

There is no distinction between biblical theology and systematic theology. I have always thought of systematic theology as being mainly concerned with the history of doctrine. It concerns itself, therefore, less with the scriptural basis of doctrine (if there is such basis) than with the meaning and development of doctrine. Biblical theology, on the other hand, concerns itself directly with biblical exegesis and interpretation, in terms other than those of later doctrinal teaching. St Paul, for instance, was altogether a biblical theologian; he dealt directly with the Scriptures of the Old Testament and did not assume any doctrines ready made. He would therefore be quite puzzled if, were he alive to-day, he were asked to answer a question of systematic theology such as, What is the doctrine of justification by faith? For him, such justification was an *experience*, not a *doctrine*.

What I am getting at is that I cannot understand anyone being satisfied to base his theology on doctrines when we can get back to original experience. And here is just where the Bible comes in, and where it shows itself to be alone worthy the serious study of Christian people. It expresses in a way which is called " inspired," and which means beyond the ordinary powers of the human mind, the essential experience of God by

the human race; and, moreover, in the reading of the Scriptures that same experience is engendered in the person so occupied.

For me, therefore, the recovery of biblical theology is the one and only necessity. If we impregnate ourselves with biblical thought, using the Bible as its own commentary, we shall build up in our minds a framework of thought into which all world events easily fit. This framework is in all respects identical with what I believe is known as Fundamentalism; but do not let a term put us off by its associations. Let us speak of *neo-Fundamentalism.* The force of the prefix will be to liberate the main term from its objectionable elements, and to indicate that there is carried into an old idea a new spirit which makes it shine and show its real worth.

If anyone has read thus far, he will want to ask me: Do you wish to return to biblical literalism—verbal inspiration? Yes, and No. If pressed, I should say Yes. It is safer to be a verbal inspirationist than to hold a liberal view of the Bible, which amounts to rejecting its main fundamental ideas and only using some ideas and fitting them into an evolutionary mode of thought. I should like to enumerate and develop the main fundamental ideas of Scripture, but my ability would certainly be overtaxed and space here would positively forbid it!

Yours faithfully,

W. C. G. Proctor.

Harold's Cross Rectory,
Dublin.

To the Editor of Theology.

Sir,

Non tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis. It seems to me that W. K. L. C.'s quotations from *Foundations* do but make a stronger case against the school which produced it than anything Fr Mascall could say in criticism of them. Hitherto we have been content to say that pre-1914 Liberals lived in a golden haze which concealed the truth about the modern world from them. We have excused their jejune theology on the ground that it was the best which could be produced in enervating days of spaciousness. But now we are reminded that they were, in fact, conscious of the volcano beneath their feet and had diagnosed the desperate disease of modern culture in its less advanced stages. So far, so good. But what had they to propose as a remedy, beyond a reduced, non-transcendental and non-apocalyptic Christianity? Not one of the passages cited suggests that they had anything better to offer. Were they not in the position of men who in the face of a riot have nothing better to recommend than the disarming of the police? To vary the simile, is not the doctor who cannot follow up his

diagnosis with an adequate prescription as much a failure as the practitioner who fails to notice the disease?

And a still more damaging question at once occurs to the mind. Why did the authors of *Foundations* fail to recommend "the mixture as before"? Only two answers seem possible. Either they did not think that historic integral Christianity would meet the case—a conclusion uncomplimentary alike to their acumen and their faith—or they anticipated a refusal on the part of the patient to take his medicine, and therefore watered it down and disguised the taste with jam until it became denatured and useless—an even more damning possibility. I hesitate in front of the horns of this dilemma, merely venturing to point out that the latter accusation was the one made against them at the time. "Most of us know the rather old-fashioned style of doctor, who in prescribing for an ailment will say, 'H'm, let's see; d'ye smoke? Well, I dare say a little tobacco doesn't do you any harm. Drink? Well, I don't see why you shouldn't drink, as long as it's in moderation. Not fond of medicines, eh? No, I don't see why you need take any medicines. You might take a little holiday from work, I think, and enjoy yourself a bit; and mind you aren't up after one.' It is a very agreeable method of treatment, but the patient who is conscious of serious organic disturbance is not reassured by it." (R. A. Knox, *Some Loose Stones*, p. 17). Was *Foundations* and much like it so unjustly dubbed the theology of "How much will Jones swallow?"?

I am, sir,
Yours faithfully,
THOMAS M. PARKER.

PUSEY HOUSE,
OXFORD.
February 3, 1940.

COMMENT ON THEOLOGICAL PERIODICALS

THE outbreak of war has naturally affected the contents of recent theological literature, whether from a practical point of view in calling attention to detailed problems or from the need of passing a judgment upon political tendencies of the time. *The East and West Review* for January, 1940,[1] raises the question of the war from the standpoint of the missionary. Dr Wilson Cash, general secretary of the Church Missionary Society, calls attention to the state of missions in war-time, and pleads that missionary endeavour should face the issue and should see Christianity as the only way to a lasting peace. "If I were a Jew"—an anonymous article—is a suggestive sidelight on

[1] S.P.C.K. 1s. quarterly.

Palestinian problems. The development of the Church in India is described by J. R. Peacey. *The International Review of Missions*[1] includes a lengthy editorial survey of 1939 written under the shadow of war. Important, too, are the articles by Dr Rall on the authority of the Christian Faith, which is a plea for a prophetic religion with an authority vested in God alone, and the note by C. F. Andrews on the colour-bar in India. *The Ashram Review*[2] for October, 1939, includes a suggestive article on St Francis in war-time, whilst *The Chichester Diocesan Gazette*[3] of December, 1939, includes some war-time thoughts by Dr R. J. Campbell and Mr R. A. Edwards. The latter will especially repay reading.

More political in its aim is *Radical Religion*, the quarterly edited by Dr Reinhold Niebuhr.[4] It is the magazine of the Fellowship of Socialist Christians. The number dated Fall, 1939, is especially stimulating. D. R. Davies, now known through his recent striking book, writes on the tendencies and defects of the British Socialist movement. He discusses them as one who has known that movement thoroughly from the inside. A criticism of the Labour Party is followed by an analysis of recent manifestations of the religious tendencies of the Left-Wing. The criticisms of the Christian Left and of the politico-religious activities of the Dean of Canterbury touch a weak spot in this particular movement. It is old-fashioned religious liberalism making a different political choice. Fr Conrad Noel writes of his movement, the Order of the Church Militant. Mr Heimann discusses war-guilt in an article which acquits neither Hitler nor Chamberlain. Mr Hartshorne on pastoral paradoxes and Mr Sikes's discussion of the Bible and social change should also be read, as should a striking pacifist article by Miss Beavers. Interesting too are the editorial notes. An excellent number which, in many ways, goes to the roots of the present troubles.

The Modern Churchman[5] likewise makes mention of the war. Dr Major is strongly in favour of the use of resistance to Nazi aggression, although this point of view is not altogether supported by several correspondents. The issue of November, 1939, has an article by Mr Bulcock on the relationship of Christian religious experience to doctrine, which deals with the problem of Christology in terms of faith whilst discarding first-century thought-forms. A note by the Bishop of Truro on Spirit-Bearing—the use of the term *pneumatophoros* in the Septuagint and the Fathers—is also important. It should be read in conjunction with a university sermon on the Spirit of Man and the Spirit

[1] Oxford University Press. 3s. quarterly. [2] Christa Prema Seva Sangha, Poona, 5. 1s. 3d. quarterly. [3] A. R. Mowbray and Co., Ltd. 6d. monthly. [4] English Agent: Rev. A. Nash, 36, Victoria Street, S.W. 1. 1s. quarterly. [5] Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 1s. monthly.

of God which appears in the December number from the same author. In this issue the debate on the Church and war is continued in the correspondence columns, whilst Dr Major, in his editorial notes, reverts to the matter and discusses the conflicting views of Dr W. R. Inge and of Dr Nathaniel Micklem. There is an essay from the present writer contrasting Cardinal Newman with his Unitarian brother, Professor Francis Newman.

The Modern Churchmen's Union issue a small quarterly, *The Way*, in which some useful material has been published.[1] Recent numbers have included short articles by the Bishop of Sheffield, Dr C. J. Cadoux, Canon Harold Anson, Mr Hardwick, Mr Macrae Cann, and Mr T. M. Parker. The small size of the magazine is a restriction to the length of contributions, but the articles are all suggestive of larger issues which demand a full treatment in the light of present events. Especially interesting is the manner in which the editor seems anxious to raise the problems of the relationship of the Church to society. It is reverted to in a number of the articles.

The Clergy Review,[2] a well-edited and scholarly Roman Catholic publication, deserves to be better known among Anglicans. In the November, 1939, number, Dom Ernest Graf, O.S.B., discusses the doctrine of purgatory, whilst Mr Richard O'Sullivan contributes an article dealing with the recent report on the modification of the abortion laws which is an illustration of the manner in which Roman Catholic theology conflicts with the modern attitude of public opinion. In a case now famous, Dr Bourne was not only acquitted by the jury at the Old Bailey, but likewise by the more influential newspapers and by instructed public opinion. To many who would desire to safeguard Christian morality, it will seem more than doubtful whether the Roman Catholic logic of Mr O'Sullivan will secure this end, or, indeed, whether that logic is more Christian than the verdict of public opinion and the findings of the committee. The discussion of the modern state-cult and the meaning of Cæsar-worship is undertaken in a scholarly manner in an essay by Mr F. R. Hoare, which is concluded in the December number. An article by Mr Denis Gwynn on the problems of evacuation and one by Fr Martindale on homiletics contained in the same number are likewise worthy of attention.

The Harvard Theological Review[3] is a publication with an appeal to the theological specialist. The issue for the last quarter of 1939 contains two essays. Dom Christopher Butler, of Downside Abbey, writes on the debt of Matthew to Luke, challenging the usually accepted views of Synoptic students in a manner which, if accepted, will lead to a drastic revision of critical presuppo-

[1] The Modern Churchmen's Union. 3d. quarterly. [2] Burns Oates and Washbourne, Ltd. 2s. monthly. [3] Oxford University Press. $1·00 quarterly.

sitions. Mr Cawley writes on the figure of Loki in Germanic mythology. *The Review of Religion* for November, 1939,[1] likewise contains articles with an especial appeal to the theologian. Mr Olmstead writes on Zoroaster, whilst Dr Garvie discusses the conception of the divine personality, concluding his essay with an impressive protest against the measurement of the Godhead by the limited mind of the creature. Dr D. C. Macintosh raises the question as to whether theology is valuational or existential. His accusation that the theology of Reinhold Niebuhr may lead to a stultifying irrationalism should be studied by the many English admirers of the brilliant American. Mr C. A. Manning has an important communication on the Orthodox Churches of the Balkans in 1939.

The number of *The English Catholic* for Winter, 1939,[2] includes some useful articles by Dr C. B. Moss, the Rev. V. L. Johnstone, and Mr. E. G. P. Wyatt, from the standpoint of moderate Anglican catholicism.

F. H. Amphlett Micklewright.

THE CITY OF THE FUTURE

(For Refreshment Sunday)

Footsore and bruised from her warfare's waging
The Church Expectant turneth her to rest,
Seeking in Paradisal streams assuaging
Of wounds received in many a valiant gest.
Yet brooks and pastures green are but the token
Of that for which saints from the altar call:
More glorious things than these of thee are spoken,
Jerusalem, dear mother of us all,
Radiant and free, from God's right hand descending,
The trysting-place where faith with vision meets.
Truth is thy law, thy commerce love unending,
And children's play the traffic of thy streets.
Yea, he that promised wearieth not nor faints,
God hath prepared a city for his saints.

J. S. MacArthur.

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[1] Columbia University Press. 60 cents. bi-monthly. [2] A. T. Broome and Son, Oxford. 4d. quarterly.

SURVEY

EIGHT NEW BOOKS

THERE lies before me a little pile of eight books and a request from the Editor that I should write about them for THEOLOGY. It is a collection which defies classification, so that the only way is to take each volume separately. Their only common features are that all alike are new and that each deals with the fundamental truths of the Christian religion. I will take the largest first.

Dom Aelred Graham, a monk of Ampleforth Abbey, has produced a fine spiritual treatise on *The Love of God* (Longmans, 7s. 6d.). The importance of his subject needs no emphasis, and his treatment of this great theme is careful, scholarly, and marked throughout by a spirit of humble and adoring reverence. This is not to suggest that his writing is in any way sentimental; on the contrary it makes a strong appeal to a critical and thinking mind. He has divided his subject under four main heads, in which he deals with the nature of the love which binds man to God, its conditions, its expression and its effects. As he confesses in his Introduction, the author has been prevented by lack of space from treating his theme exhaustively, yet one wonders if the book would have been at all improved by a fuller treatment. It is so good as it is, so full of suggestiveness, so profound yet simple, and withal so charitable in its tone that it is hard to see how and where it could have been improved. Nor could it have made its appearance at a more suitable season.

There is another book in my collection by a Roman Catholic author—*The Four First Things*, by R. H. J. Steuart, S.J. (Longmans, 3s. 6d.). The four "first things"—the fundamentals of religion in general and of the religion revealed in Christ—are, according to the author, knowledge of God, knowledge of Christ, Faith and Prayer. Under these headings the author has dealt with the things which "a Christian ought to know and believe to his soul's health," and the means whereby his knowledge and faith should find their expression in the service of God and man. Fr Steuart is a guide whose writings are marked alike by spiritual insight and practical common sense. Although in this little book (it has less than a hundred pages) he deals with the biggest subjects in the briefest possible way, he does not fail to expound adequately either the theological background or the practical issues. We need at this time to be sent back in our thought and prayer to the great foundation facts and truths of our religion, and Fr Steuart has done this for us in a way that should commend itself to every type of Christian believer. This is indeed a great little book.

Another book which takes the reader back to the fundamental issues of the Christian religion is *The Conflict of the Cross*, by

O. E. Burton (James Clarke, 3s. 6d.). The author, if we are allowed to use labels, is a "liberal" who sees in the cross the only satisfying answer to the deepest needs of man, and so places it in the centre of the modern scene. This leads him to look in two directions: backward to consider the nature of God and the fact of human sin, and forward to the significance of the resurrection and the Christian life of communion with God.

How Christ bore the Sin of the World (Marshall, Morgan and Scott, 5s.) is the title of a book dealing with the problem of sin in its relation to the atoning work of Christ. The author is W. W. Lucas, and his treatment is scriptural rather than theological. As a piece of biblical scholarship the book is to be commended for the care and patience of the author; but the excessive number of textual references given in footnotes is a trifle overwhelming—there must be nearly fifteen hundred in the hundred and fifty pages of the book. The author's attitude to the Bible is conservative.

Jesus the Son of God, by Frederick Greeves (Epworth Press, 3s. 6d.), is an attempt to define what "faith in the divine Christ meant to the first Christians and to those who composed the creeds." The author proceeds to an analysis of present-day intellectual difficulties and hindrances to faith, and argues the necessity for the preaching of the gospel as the world's only hope. In his desire to gain a hearing amid the confusion and unbelief of to-day the author suggests a restatement of the gospel message. His suggestions may not commend themselves to readers of THEOLOGY, but at least they are provocative and stimulating.

In July, 1939, the fourth international conference of evangelical students was held at Cambridge. Some of the addresses delivered at this conference have been printed in *Christ and Freedom* (The Inter-Varsity Fellowship, 2s.). The student life of thirty nations was represented. Of the twelve chapters of this little book, eight are by non-British evangelicals, chiefly from the Scandinavian countries. The theme of freedom had a certain urgency at the time of the conference, and that urgency has now increased a hundredfold. We are fighting for liberty: this book makes clear how Christian a thing it is.

Is there any preacher who has not, in times of stress or dullness, fallen back gratefully on the help to be derived from the sermons of others? *A Living Faith*, by F. C. Spurr (Allenson, 3s. 6d.), is a book which should help many a preacher to find the best way to proclaim the great truths of the Gospel. This is a day when the preaching office has taken on a new importance and a new urgency. Mr Spurr's outlines in this book cover every aspect of Christian life and witness both personal and social. He preaches less to expound than to convert. To him the preacher is first and foremost a prophet.

There is abundant need for more preaching of this kind in the Church of England to-day, and there is much we can learn as to the method and arrangement of our material from these outlines. Our material itself must, of course, be the fruit of our own waiting upon God.

The last of my pile of books is a collection of addresses to students and others by Dr W. M. MacGregor, called *Persons and Ideals* (T. and T. Clark, 3s.). Some of these addresses are concerned with persons, others with the Christian ministry. A few deal with wider and deeper questions. In all alike is discernible the devout and scholarly outlook of the author, his wisdom and his breadth of Christian charity. It is a book for those who find refreshment in quiet reflective writing, and inspiration in the study of great but simple men.

In this time of bewilderment and strain it is good to be recalled (as each of these books would recall us) to the great truths of religion which no outward circumstances can alter. The loving fatherhood of God, the atoning work of Christ, the liberty of the human soul, the great ideals of Christian living—these are the things which matter. These are the truths which not only endure but encourage. In a world of becoming it is good to hold on to the world of being.

H. L. Hubbard.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE DEFENCE OF DEMOCRACY. By John Middleton Murry. Jonathan Cape. 10s. 6d.

This book was written during the interval between the Munich Agreement and the German seizure of Czecho-Slovakia. Though at the time Mr Murry was under no illusion about the nature and enormity of the totalitarian threat, part of his argument is coloured by his reading of these exceptional months. With most of us, he took as a final political strategy what now appears rather as a tactical turning of the hostile flank, and his practical conclusion for British foreign policy is a passionate plea for the maintenance of peace at any price.

Superficially the book has thus lost all immediate relevance. But this refutation on the plane of the politics of the day only brings its fundamental aspects into relief. Mr Murry has given us here no less than the modern British Manifesto of Religious Socialism. He attempts to do for England what Reinhold Niebuhr is doing for America, and Paul Tillich did for Germany. Far from trying to prop up institutional Christianity by social reform, or to engraft a few moral principles on some secular brand of Socialism, Mr Murry is the first English thinker who takes Christianity and Marxism equally seriously. "That Marx revealed elements of historical, social and economic truth which Christianity must accept not only because they are true, but because their acceptance is indispensable to an understanding of the Christian Gospel itself in the circumstances of the day, is a main argument of this book" (p. 117).

To reach this conclusion, Mr Murry had, first of all, to pierce through the fog of prejudice and misinterpretation which still hides the philosophical foundations of Marx's teaching. Through a careful study of Marx's early writings (no systematic edition of which is available in English as yet), especially of the *Deutsche Ideologie*, he comes to realize that, in spite of Marx's denunciation of religion, his interpretation of history has a definitely religious character. By making society rather than the individual the hero of the religious drama in which mankind as a whole struggles towards universal regeneration, Marx follows in the footsteps of the Hebrew prophets. The suffering servant of this third Isaiah is the proletariat who, by breaking the fetters of a dehumanized social system, is to redeem human nature in all on the higher plane of socialist freedom.

Christians must not be hasty in rejecting what may not be a message but yet is a fair indictment of nineteenth-century capitalism, and of the compromise which organized Christianity made with this order. By completely emancipating the institution of property from human obligations, early industrial-

ism, in fact, abandoned the working masses to the destructive demonry of a competitive mechanism devoid of all true human relations. To save themselves from sheer physical destruction, at this stage the working classes were driven on the path of social revolution. This is, as Mr Murry rightly emphasizes, the factual background for the materialist conception of history in which the movement towards human emancipation is understood as a " necessity " independent of moral impulses, almost in analogy to the processes of the physical world. Here are also the roots of Marx's paradoxical statement that the essence of man is " the ensemble of social relations." Under such conditions of life individual freedom was indeed an illusion. Real were only the collectives, the enslaving social order and the revolutionary class which struggled for emancipation.

The " Societization of Man " has not decreased since Marx wrote. With international interdependence added to the complicated network of intranational social and economic relations, it has become impossible for man to be good unless society is good. But society cannot be made good unless, by an act of regeneration, the individual reaches full consciousness of his social dependence and, by this, acquires a new freedom to redeem society. Here, in the dialectics of psychology and philosophy of history, Mr Murry discovers the deepest affinity between Marx and true Christianity.

The practical conclusions which Marx and, above all, his followers have drawn from this " Weltanschauung " compel, however, Mr Murry, both as a religious thinker and a social reformer, to part with orthodox Marxism. Marx's assumption that the economic structure of modern society forms an autodynamic whole moving toward socialism from inner necessity has been disproved by the rise of " capitalist democracy " or, as Mr Murry prefers to call our era, of " post-capitalist democracy." In the building up of the social service State and the gradual extension of parliamentary franchise, property has resigned its claim to the exclusive possession of political power, and has reluctantly accepted new human obligations. One could well call this development a revolution, though one which differs fundamentally from that which Marx envisaged. It raised the working classes to a position in which they have much more to lose than their chains, politically as well as economically. Yet this very incorporation of the masses into capitalist society has destroyed their revolutionary solidarity and " natural " righteousness. By acquiring political power, the proletariat became responsible, and has therefore ceased to exist in the old sense of a natural force making for destruction and regeneration. Only if henceforth its members consciously strive for the good society can it preserve itself as a dynamic class. But this way is open to the members of all other classes,

which is only a different way of stating that, in post-capitalist democracy, there cannot exist any naturally revolutionary class but only conscious revolutionary individuals.

The consequences of this development are equally far-reaching for theory and practice. It reinstates the individual as a moral person and responsible agent of the social process, and rediscovers the dimension of political action as the real battleground for the socialist. With this, however, democracy, which had only an instrumental value for Marx, becomes the modern socialist's real and final concern. By investing political power in the individual person as such, democracy is the final *form* of political society. To fill this form with the socialist content, economics must be subjected to democratic politics, or, in other words, democracy must be dissociated from capitalism. Establishment of real social justice—that is, equality of opportunity, supersession of socially irresponsible ownership and control of the instruments of collective production, and, finally, the defence of the democratic form itself against all dictatorial temptations—these are for Mr Murry the basic principles of a socialist democracy.

The decisive stage of his analysis is, however, reached only when Mr Murry looks out for the way in which post-capitalist democracy can be transformed into socialist democracy. He radically rejects violent revolution, which not only threatens industrial society with catastrophe but is in itself a retreat from the level of political maturity already attained. " There is only one way . . . through revolutionary moral and religious change in the individual citizen of democracy " (p. 151). This passage should not be misunderstood as a flight from the political plane into the sphere of " private goodness." On the contrary, " in a democracy it is of supreme importance that the institutions of society . . . should be—to the utmost extent possible—good " (p. 216). But the transformation of the institutional world, if it is to be a transformation of its true substance, must be brought about by calling the members of post-capitalist democracy to their true vocation: the evangelization of the social collective. Democracy is not only historically a development of Christian civilization because " the duty of regarding members of society as ends . . . is axiomatic only for Christian minds " (p. 214). It is essentially a Christian political society, inspired by the discipline of Christian fraternity in its " attempt to approximate the earthly city to the city of God " (p. 215). " The democratic movement, therefore, is compelled by the necessities of the internal and the external situation to become a religious movement " (p. 267). But equally the national Church to-day can fulfil its most important function only if it makes itself " the chief means of educating the members of a mass-democracy to a knowledge of their responsibility as members of a Christian secular society " (p. 281). To achieve this, " the democracy

within democracy " will have to be mobilized and organized—that is to say, all spontaneous forces in the clergy and laity who, in common loyalty to fundamental Christian values, are prepared to think and act for society as a whole.

It cannot be the aim of a short review to take up a fundamental discussion of all the cardinal issues this book raises. As a challenge to religious as well as to political conventions, and as a positive formulation of a new Christian politics, it cannot be taken seriously enough. Its idea of a Christian democracy forms the criterion by which the attitude of the Church towards the national and international life will have to be judged in the decisive years to come. One may feel that the exceptional conditions of British social history and its gradual evolution to political democracy do perhaps not fully meet the case of Germany and the Central European states. In spite of all the dangers which Mr Murry rightly emphasizes, there political revolution in the traditional sense may prove inevitable if the framework of democracy is to be re-established, or rather established for the first time. And even countries where the democratic foundations seemed secure in times of peace will have to watch very carefully the impact which war is making on their political and social order. Otherwise, both working classes and middle classes might find themselves pushed back one day from the political plane of responsibility, where radical social change can be left to " gradual education " (p. 144), to the subhuman level of a struggle for survival. But even so, the values for which this book stands remain the lode-star for political reconstruction.

Adolf Löwe.

The Twenty Years' Crisis. By E. H. Carr. Macmillan. 10s. 6d.

Professor Carr's book is a valuable study of the conflict between idealism (here called " utopianism ") and realism in international politics during the last twenty years. It is a good corrective to over-simple ideas of the problem of international morality, and one that should be read by enthusiasts for constitutional panaceas, such as Federal Unionists. He shows how the theory of international law during the last twenty years has been largely dominated by ideas from nineteenth-century liberalism, which have already been recognized as too simple in domestic politics, but have been transferred to the international sphere partly under the influence of American intellectuals, partly in response to a well-meaning but inadequately informed public opinion. Chief among such ideas is that of the " natural harmony of interests "—namely, that what is good for each must be good for all, and vice versa. This does not face the problem set by facts of real divergences and conflicts of interests, and moreover he

shows how it is a theory which naturally commends itself to those, like ourselves, whose interests are served by the existing distribution of things. But Professor Carr is surely wrong in laying the chief blame for the theory of the " natural harmony of interests " on Bentham. Bentham held that the business of legislation was to secure the artificial identification of interests —a very different matter. The legislator must make social conduct pay and anti-social conduct not pay by skilful application of " sanctions." He took over from Hume the principle that the art of politics consists in governing individuals through their own interests by creating artifices of such a kind that, in spite of their avarice and ambition, they should co-operate for the public good—a method not so unlike that which Professor Carr himself advocates. A similar lack of first-hand knowledge of his philosophic sources seems to be revealed by the monstrous statement on p. 89: " Germany's dramatic rise to power in the 'sixties and 'seventies of the last century was impressive enough to make the leading British philosophers of the next generation—Caird, T. H. Green, Bosanquet, MacTaggart (*sic*)—ardent Hegelians. Thereafter, the Kaiser's telegram to Kruger and the German naval programme spread the conviction among British thinkers that Hegel was a less good philosopher than had been supposed; and since 1914 no British philosopher of repute has ventured to sail under the Hegelian flag." But Bradley, the greatest of the English Hegelians, died only in 1924, and his work and that of McTaggart is still a power; Lord Haldane was a Hegelian surely " of repute," not to mention a score of lesser names; and Professor Muirhead, the *doyen* of English philosophers, is to-day fighting a rearguard action in the pages of *Philosophy* defending Hegel against responsibility for German militarism. Among the younger philosophers the critical work of schools of analytic logic such as G. E. Moore's have probably had more to do than has the Kruger telegram with the decline in Hegelian modes of thought. Moreover, T. H. Green's chapter on War in the *Lectures on Political Obligation*, advocating a world court based on a common assumption of the will to work it, though more optimistic than we should now dare to be, at least shows how Hegel could be domesticated into an English liberal's view of international politics. I do not mention these points just to defend philosophers as not having always been such fools as they look; but because passages such as that quoted are symptomatic of the real weakness in Professor Carr's book. His discussions of moral theories give the impression of being derived merely from secondary sources, in contrast with the much more thorough thinking he gives us on political and legal questions. We suspect that the implicit moral philosophy underlying the book is little more than a pragmatic one which sees in morality certain desirable utopian illusions necessary to enlist the imagination of the ordinary man.

Professor Carr is not willing to accept the full implications of the view that politics are simply a matter of power. He makes a good point in showing how the ordinary man demands some sort of moral justification of national policies—he is not content to look on " power politics " as their own sufficient reason. Hence both sides in a conflict will talk in terms of peace and justice, a " new order," and so on. He shows how these professions can be used to cover up purely selfish national policies. Yet if hypocrisy is the tribute which vice pays to virtue, and if the instinct of the ordinary man in demanding some justification beyond power is sound (however limited and ill-informed his judgment), it points to moral principles being a real factor to be reckoned with. Can the almost hopeless task of moralizing international power politics be faced in the name of utopian illusions, however desirable ? How far has Professor Carr asked whether morality is concerned with certain fundamental principles of order which cannot indefinitely be disregarded without disaster even in power politics ? But Professor Carr's clear and well-documented account of the tragedy of the League of Nations' ideals during the last twenty years will help to pull off any wool which may still remain over our eyes as to the limitations of an idealism which has not adequately faced the facts concerning conflicts of power and interests, or can pretend to itself that ideas on paper may be substitutes for what politics always in fact must be—the art of the possible.

Dorothy M. Emmet.

Handbuch zum Alten Testament. Herausgegeben von Otto Eissfeldt. 3: Exodus, von Georg Beer mit einem Beitrag von Kurt Galling (J. C. B. Mohr, Tübingen). M. 7.60.

The latest addition to the series edited by Professor Eissfeldt follows the general lines of its predecessors. First comes a brief introduction and bibliography (pp. 7-11); next, two tables, arranged in parallel columns, of which the first gives, in four columns, a synopsis of the sources (J^1, J^2, E and E^1, P) combined in Exodus i-xxiv, xxxi-xxxiv; the second, in three columns, a synopsis of the two sources properly so called (P^A and P^B) and of the miscellaneous supplements (P^S) which can be distinguished within the " priestly " chapters, Exodus xxv-xxx, xxxv-xl (pp. 12-13). The main body of the book (pp. 14-179) consists of a translation of Exodus (confined to, but rarely filling, the left-hand pages); short textual, grammatical, and critical notes on the Hebrew original (kept to themselves at the foot of the translation); a commentary on the text, taken section by section ; and " excursuses " on various points of special interest or difficulty

(*e.g.*, the position of Sinai, p. 25, the name Yahweh, p. 29, Aaron, p. 36, Levi, p. 44, the place where the Red Sea was crossed, p. 75, the date of the Song of Moses, p. 83, the Sabbath, p. 90, the date of the Decalogue in Exodus xx, p. 103, the character, date and origin of the Book of the Covenant, p. 121, the date and origin of the Decalogue in Exodus xxxiv, p. 162). Professor Galling, who, as an expert in Biblical archæology, was called in to write the commentary on Ezekiel xl-xlii, xliii 10-17, in Bertholet's volume in the same series, now supplies the commentary on Exodus xxv-xxxi, xxxv-xl. The rest of the work is done by Professor Beer.

As might be expected of any book which has passed through the editorial hands of Dr Eissfeldt, the present volume is scholarly, well-informed, well-documented, judicious, and quite up to date. Perhaps its most interesting and original chapters are those in which Professor Galling works out in detail, so far as it applies to Exodus, the theory (put forward in 1934 by G. v. Rad) that, quite apart from miscellaneous later amplifications, two distinct traditions can be traced in P, and shows by actual drawings (pp. 135, 141) how different are the pictures of the Sanctuary and of the High Priest's breastplate presented on the one hand by P^A, and on the other hand by P^B.

If there is less that is new in the chapters written by Professor Beer, there is not less that is worthy of praise. He gives brief and clear summaries of such earlier opinions as deserve to be considered, and steers a middle course between undue scepticism and excessive credulity. For him, Moses is an historical person who lived in the thirteenth century B.C. Through the mists of saga and legend which surround his story as it is told in Exodus actual events can still be dimly seen. One such event was an epidemic which made possible the escape of the oppressed Israelites from the land of their bondage and which now appears as a divine death-sentence on all the first-born in Egypt (p. 59). Certain passages in his commentary cannot fail to make the attentive reader wonder whether it is only of Pharaoh and oppressed Israelites that Professor Beer is thinking (pp. 28 *f.*, 46, 99, 118, 157).

F. S. Marsh.

On to Orthodoxy. By D. R. Davies. (Religious Book Club.)

This book is an exposition in a popular and clearly intelligible form of the teaching of Niebuhr and his school by one who has passed through several phases of Christian thought and activity during the last half-century—Modernist, Socialist, Pacifist, Communist—to wrench himself free from the fallacies of each in turn and find himself established upon the new Orthodoxy as upon a rock, yet not statically, for he has many vistas upon it still to explore. Orthodoxy is, however, for him no merely

derived opinion, but an intense conviction which he has made his own. Indeed, the frequent glimpses of religious autobiography which he permits the reader are so frank and ingenuous as to be somewhat embarrassing. Nevertheless, his main interest is not in himself—even though he might at times lead one to suspect so—but in the sad and sorry world in which he finds himself, and a tremendous deep concern for its welfare shines through even his most personal references. His main motif is a vehement invective against the Christian Liberalism in which he was brought up, but this, however regrettable, is necessary as a foil for the development of his case for Orthodoxy which he unfolds in the latter half of his book (from p. 112 and on), and which is by far the better half since it is positive and constructive. Humanism is in his view " the secular faith by which Europe has lived for 500 years," and Liberal theology is " the abortive miscarriage of Humanism," of which Nazism on the contrary is " the final blossom." Such phrases are of course extravagant, but they undoubtedly contain an aspect of truth when the human scene is viewed through one window. To such a view the Dark Ages of Catholicism are not so dark as the Night of Protestantism that succeeded the Renaissance of Art and Learning. Any stigma is good enough to flog a dead dogma with. Christian Liberalism, now moribund if not defunct, was (*e.g.*) idealistic, sentimental, subjective, romantic; the new Orthodoxy on the contrary is realistic, prophetic, objective, historic. The latter epithets are strangely reminiscent of those applied by autocrats to their authoritarian states; it may be not without significance that they or their synonyms are in current use by advocates of an authoritarian faith.

The writer describes himself, and with truth, as " the representative of a whole tendency." The tendency is a swing—so sudden and violent as to seem almost a jerk—from left to right, theologically; and from right to left, politically. As a movement in the Church it is vigorous, disciplined, international, and its adherents are numerous, especially among the young, who like to be definite and decisive and up to date, and for whom (to borrow a few words from its own terminology) its dialectical method is relevant to the contemporary situation. It is likely to hold the theological field for the next decade at least.

To the detached observer of this tendency, however, there arises a doubt and a wonderment as to whereunto it may grow. It will countenance no kind of heresy, will brook no sort of schism; there is no truth in the one, no rectitude in the other; its demand is for unanimity of belief and uniformity of practice and nothing less than that. But in a world of such multiple diversity, it may be hesitatingly asked, can these keep—have they ever kept—unity of spirit in the bond of peace ? Its roots are eschatological, professedly Hebraic, because it reads the

Bible as one synthetic whole; it repudiates in root and branch Greek philosophical mysticism: yet in reality its uncompromising logicality is Latin; for the religious consciousness of the whole Semitic race, of which the Hebrew is the finest flower, expresses itself concretely in images, not abstractly in concepts. It is Augustinian, though clean shorn of his Platonic background; in its dialectical approach to the several pairs of opposites in religious experience it is always biased in the direction of the objective—to such an extent indeed that it sometimes tends to make the transcendent God appear almost as " nominativus pendens " in his universe. In its emphasis on the divine initiative, human creatureliness and impotence, original sin, and all that follows therefrom, does it perhaps forget that in the divinest parable of the soul's pilgrimage it was the prodigal son in his self-despair, and not the patient, waiting Father, who made the first apparent move to reconciliation—to be met with forgiveness more than halfway? In the experience of conversion may not the word simultaneity be taken as a truer description than the words initiative and response? Does it perhaps also forget that it was actually the extraordinary and revolutionary humanism of Jesus that made him suspect in the eyes of theocratic, theocentric Pharisaism? And finally, is the one-sided dualism which it presents in the long run philosophically tenable? Or will it confess that it spells the ultimate bankruptcy of reason? G. Seaver.

This Holy Fellowship: the Ancient Faith in the Modern Parish. A symposium in honour of the late Frank Gavin, edited by E. R. Hardy, Jr, and W. Norman Pittenger. Morehouse-Gorham Publishing Company. New York. $2.50.

This collection of twelve essays, intended " to indicate some ways in which Catholicism may find points of contact with the world to-day," is interesting chiefly because it was written by younger pupils of the late Dr Gavin, in honour of their master; but it is not quite the book one would have expected as a memorial to that facile and brilliant man. Evidently the contributors regard themselves as of the inner circle of his disciples; but it must be confessed that few of them give evidence of having understood him either as a theologian or as an observer of the modern scene. Of the twelve essays, only five have to do with theology and apologetics as such, and only two of those have much of the Gavin vigour and sparkle. The other seven essays are concerned with practical problems of parochialia; and even within that limitation they are for the most part pedestrian. These latter range in value from Dr

Otis Rice's really excellent paper on " Psychological Insight in Pastoral Care," and a competent paper by Miss Mary Brisley (the only woman in the group) on the relationship of pastoral work to professional social service, all the way to a too timid and turgid paper by Thomas Bigham on " The Parish in Social Reformation," and to a quite juvenile treatment of " Religious Education " by R. N. Rodenmayer; but what all these bits of sound advice to budding clergymen have to do with Frank Gavin, it is a little difficult to see. Nor does one expect quite such a variety of subjects or such variation of merit in a volume edited by Messrs Pittenger and Hardy. Perhaps they have been a little too desirous of following Dr Gavin's often-repeated advice to " encourage young men, all young men."

Of the more serious essays, the best by far is Mr Pittenger's on " The Christian Assertions." This serves to confirm an impression, given by his little book, *The Approach to Christianity* (published in London this autumn), that he has unusual gifts as a popular apologist for liberal Catholicism. The essay has clarity, pungency, relevancy. Mr Pittenger knows his theology, and also what intelligent citizens of the world are thinking and saying. He fulfils the requirement stated by T. P. Ferris in his discriminating paper on " Present-Day Preaching," that the clergyman " must speak a language that his contemporaries understand." Mr Ferris's paper is very much worth-while. He insists that modern preaching must (1) help the hearers to face tragedy rather than hide from it; (2) recognize that youth has largely recovered from its nihilism and frustration, which are now left to the middle-aged and older; and (3) concern itself not so much with the problem of whether men and women *ought* to be good as with the question of how they *can* be good. Mr Pittenger's and Mr Ferris's articles make this book worth buying; and Dr Gavin in Paradise must be proud of such pupils.

It is too bad that equally kind things cannot be said for the initial essay, on " The World Around Us," by John Atherton Bell. One suspects that Mr Bell is over-enamoured of the " arty and lit'ry crowds." His recommended bibliography features the earlier Aldous Huxley, C. Day Lewis and Stephen Spender; but he seems oblivious of politics or economics. Nor can one wax enthusiastic over the theology of one who, like Mr Bell, describes the Incarnation as a belief that " God became a man," or insists that " the heart of the Christian religion is not ethereal [whatever that may mean] but material." One suspects that Mr Bell is like Karl Marx in never having troubled to define what he means by " material."

Dr Hardy has small opportunity in his too brief paper on " The Sacred Liturgy " to show forth his real and varied scholarship. He has been far too modest, and has edited himself too much out of the picture. He and Mr Pittenger jointly deal

with "The Use of the Bible To-day" in a manner scholarly and suggestive. Father Chalmers, O.H.C., writes on the spiritual life with obvious sincerity, though he has said nothing that has not been told us many times before. Dean Fosbroke of the General Seminary, in a preface, pays brief but eloquent tribute to Dr Gavin's memory.

BERNARD IDDINGS BELL.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.)

ALLEN AND UNWIN: F. M. Ford, *The March of Literature* (16s.).

B. BLACKWELL: F. Kern, *Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages* (12s. 6d.).

BLOUD ET GAY: M. Nédoncelle, *La Souffrance : Réflexions d'un Chrétien* (5 frs.).

BURNS OATES AND WASHBOURNE: V. Macnabb, *Mary of Nazareth* (5s.).

CASTERMAN (TOURNAI): A. Smallwood, *Essai sur la nature de l'unité religieuse.*

C.L.A.: W. G. Peck, *The Realm of Prayer* (1s.); H. Burn-Murdoch, *Confirmation : Its Real Meaning* (4d.).

EYRE AND SPOTTISWOODE: W. R. Matthews, *The Moral Issues of the War* (1s.).

FAITH PRESS: C. E. Douglas, *The Covenant of Peace* (1s. 6d.).

GOLLANCZ: John Strachey, *A Programme for Progress* (Left Book Club, 2s. 6d.); D. L. Sayers, *Begin Here* (6s.).

LONGMANS: W. H. Elliott, etc., *What can we do now?* (6d.); P. Green, *The Path of Life* (3s. 6d.); W. R. Matthews, *Following Christ* (2s. 6d.); J. O. Hannay, *The Potter's Wheel* (3s. 6d.); E. Underhill, *Abba : Meditations based upon the Lord's Prayer* (2s. 6d.); Dom Aelred Graham, *The Love of God* (7s. 6d.).

MACMILLAN: W. Temple, *Studies in St John's Gospel*, 2nd series (8s. 6d.); V. Brittain, *Testament of Friendship : The Story of Winifred Holtby* (10s. 6d.); H. R. Trevor-Roper, *Archbishop Laud* (21s.); A. C. Bradley, *Ideals of Religion* (12s. 6d.); S. Alexander, *Philosophical and Literary Pieces* (15s.).

MOWBRAYS: Fr Andrew, *The Song of Redeeming Love* (1s. 6d.); E. Heriz-Smith, *The Sinner and the Cross* (1s. 6d.).

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS: Sir A. Zimmern, *Spiritual Values and World Affairs* (7s. 6d.); J. Perkins, *Westminster Abbey*, vol. ii (Alcuin Club, 25s.).

RELIGIOUS BOOK CLUB: D. Sheppard and L. Housman, *What can we Believe?* (2s. 6d.).

SHELDON PRESS: W. and H. Kendrick, *The New Testament for Children* (10d.).

S.C.M. PRESS: W. A. Brown, *God at Work* (2s. 6d.); W. H. Elliott, *Spiritual Issues of the War* (9d.); H. W. Robinson, *Suffering, Human and Divine* (6s.); G. L. Russell, *Sex Problems in War-time*; R. A. Chaput, *The Road to War and The Way Out* (9d. each).

S.P.C.K.: C. Smyth, *The Art of Preaching, 747-1939* (8s. 6d.); *Martha's Prayer Book* (1s.); E. Martin, *The Children's Offering in Lent* (1s.); E. S. Loveday, *The Rising Waters* (1s.); J. P. Hodges, *The Glory of God* (1s.); N. Arseneiev, *Holy Moscow* (4s. 6d.); R. Corkey, *War, Pacifism and Peace* (4s.); C. V. Pilcher, *The Hereafter in Jewish and Christian Thought* (7s. 6d.); R. R. Williams, *Religion and the English Vernacular* (4s. 6d.); W. K. L. Clarke, *The English Liturgy in the Light of the Bible* (2s. 6d.); M. Sims-Williams, *By Action and Debate* (2s.).

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